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Abstract
This thesis gives an overview of the existing literature on economic analy-
sis of corruption and the transition process in Central and Eastern Europe
(including the republics of former Yugoslavia and Albania) as well as in the
Commonwealth of Independent States. Three formal models (benevolent
principal, grabbing hand, and self-reinforcing corruption) are presented and
a series of hypotheses is deduced. Some of these hypotheses are tested em-
pirically in a sample of 28 countries. Extreme Bounds Analyses are applied
to test the robustness of regression results using variables from a variety of
datasets, including data from Transparency International, the World Bank’s
BEEPS survey, and others.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Gambol: You think you could just steal from us, and walk away?
The Joker: Yeah...1
Corruption in transition countries is a part of life of many of their inhab-
itants, visitors, and foreign investors. For example, polls in Russia revealed
that 98% of drivers have offered a bribe to a highway patrol officer at least
once. Punishment for being caught driving under the influence of alcohol can
be avoided by paying a bribe between US$ 100 and US$ 300, depending on
the model of the car. Russians perceive the housing and communal system to
be the most corrupt part of the government administration, followed by law
enforcement [Levin and Satarov, 1999, 123]. In 1996, proprietors and senior
managers in Ukraine spent an average of 30 percent of their time dealing
with officials [Rose-Ackerman, 1999]. Eastern Europe and the former Soviet
Union are countries where organized criminal groups begin to dominate oth-
erwise legal business. The stakes are in fact high, given that “nothing less
than the entire wealth of the state is up for grabs.” This behavior drives
away potential investors from the West, which basically explains why the
level of FDI from legitimate business has not been large in the countries of
the former Soviet Union and varies widely across countries (ibid, 24).
Yet, literature that performs an economic analysis of corruption in re-
gard to developing or transition countries seems to be sharply increasing
only since the last years. As Easterly points out, the four-volume, 3,047
pages Handbook of Development Economics (1988-1995) does not mention
corruption with a single word, neither does Debraj Ray’s leading textbook
Development Economics. Also international financial institutions such as
1The Dark Knight, 2008
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the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund drew their attention
towards corruption only somewhen in the early 2000s, though only by first
calling it “problems with governance.” [Easterly, 2002, 241] This concept of
“governance”, as [Dixit, 2009] puts it, “has risen from obscurity to buzzword
status in just three decades.”
A common reason why corruption was often ignored as a research topic
was that “a bribe is simply a transfer and therefore entails no serious wel-
fare losses” [Ades and Tella, 1997b, 499]. Yet, this view was questioned by
Gunnar Myrdal when he argued “that if corruption is allowed, government
officials will have an interest in generating bureaucratic hurdles to demand
bribes.” (ibid)
On the other hand there are a couple of economists who started analyz-
ing corruption already in the 1960s. An important author is Susan Rose-
Ackerman, who in 1978 published her seminal book Corruption: A Study in
Political Economy [Rose-Ackerman, 1978].
The Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI) delivers citations of 4036 pub-
lished social sciences, arts, and humanities articles on corruption2. As figure
1.1 shows, there is a strong increase in the number of articles on this topic,
with 1996 being the first year counting more than one hundred.
Since many observers have been shocked by an apparent dramatic increase
in corruption after 1989 in all the transition countries, the focus for political
economists studying the region had shifted from the economics of transition
to government in transition by 2002 [Treisman, 2003].
[Svensson, 2005] formulates eight questions about corruption that are rel-
atively representative of the current research on corruption: (i) What is cor-
ruption? (ii) Which countries are the most corrupt? (iii) What are the
common characteristics of countries with high corruption? (iv) What is the
magnitude of corruption? (v) Do higher wages for bureaucrats reduce corrup-
tion? (vi) Can competition reduce corruption? (vii) Why have there been so
few (recent) successful attempts to fight corruption? (viii) Does corruption
adversely affect growth?
This thesis tries to deliberate on what and how much of the existing and
publicly accessible literature and data are suitable for the endeavor to get
a sense of the levels and causes of corruption in the formerly communist
countries in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics.
2http://thomsonreuters.com/products_services/scientific/Social_
Sciences_Citation_Index, as of March 8, 2009
15
437
396
309
247
223
193
186
169
158
164
148
175
137
98
98
84
68
55
45
49
33
26
23
22
29
34
24
29
33
27
30
29
23
31
14
13
4
12
8
4
2
9
4
3
8
7
1
3
8
4
2
2
2
0 100 200 300 400
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
1990
1989
1988
1987
1986
1985
1984
1983
1982
1981
1980
1979
1978
1977
1976
1975
1974
1973
1972
1971
1970
1969
1968
1967
1966
1965
1964
1963
1962
1961
1960
1959
1958
1957
1956
Figure 1.1: SSCI (social sciences, arts, humanities) entries by year
16 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Definition of corruption
Due to the diverse nature of corruption and its many facets, defining
it shows to be a difficult task. Toke S. Aidt [Aidt, 2003, 633] notes that
typically a version of the following definition is used:
Definition 1 Corruption is an act in which the power of public office is
used for personal gain in a manner that contravenes the rules of the game.
[Jain, 2001, 3]
This definition has some implications for the plan of this paper: corrup-
tion is something committed by either politicians or (other) public officials.
Corruption within the private sector - though most likely existing, especially
after the privatization of former state-owned firms - will not be subject of
analysis in this paper. By linking corruption to public office, we distin-
guish corruption from illegal activities not involving the use of public office
such as fraud, money laundering, drug trade, and black market operations.
[Jain, 2001, 3] This definition immediately shows an important aspect of the
economic analysis of corruption: “rules of the game” implicitly assumes a
society in which corruption indeed is not part of the game. Yet, in many
countries, corruption has become an intrinsic part of the game’s rules, that
is, of doing business. In fact, models that will be discussed later show how
corruption, once introduced to “the game”, remains part of this “game” and
cannot be easily excluded.
While corruption is the illegal seeking of rent, it also has to be clearly
distinguished from legal rent-seeking. Pressure groups might influence politi-
cians, bureaucrats or legislators to decide in their interest. The questions
when, why and how this is done determine whether the process is free of
corruption or not. These actions of rent-seeking are legal in our sense if the
game of influencing the decision maker(s) is competitive with rules that are
known to all the players, there are no secret or side payments between the
players and the decision maker(s), and if neither the players nor the decision
maker(s) benefit from the income earned by the other [Jain, 2001, 10]. Some
authors, such as [Rose-Ackerman, 1978], explicitly include legal campaign fi-
nancing when analyzing the economics of corruption. The reason for this is
quite pragmatic: the availability of data. The other reason is that the reelec-
tion motive is very important when looking at the behavior of politicians.
[Tanzi, 1998, 9] identifies seven categories (though others could be added)
by which corrupt acts can be classified:
1. Bureaucratic (or “petty”) or political, i.e. corruption by the bureau-
cracy or by the political leadership
1.2. RATIONALE BEHIND THE ANALYSIS OF CORRUPTION 17
2. Cost-reducing (to the briber) or benefit-enhancing
3. Briber-initiated or bribee-initiated
4. Coercive or collusive
5. Centralized or decentralized
6. Predictable or arbitrary
7. Involving cash payments or not
1.2 Rationale behind the analysis of corruption
The economic analysis of corruption literature regularly comes to one
conclusion: corruption has negative effects on growth and well-being of a
society. But this analysis can do more than merely stating the obvious.
Daniel Kaufmann [Kaufmann, 1998, 147] notes that “[it] is often underplayed
[...] how insightful empirical measures of corruption can be for a host of
institutional and governance analysis (too often long in prose and short on
data). As such, it is an empirical window to deeper underlying problems.”
On a practical sidenote, a sound analysis of corruption can also lead to useful
and working policy recommendations. This is particularly true for transition
economies, given that they are an environment of constant motion, where
change is happening on a daily basis and should, of course, go into the right
direction.
1.2.1 Why an economic approach?
Corruption is a multi-faceted phenomenon. It affects political institutions
and is thus subject to political science. Since it involves a transaction be-
tween two or more people, it is also of interest to economists. It shapes not
only politics and economics, but also a country’s society and culture (see for
instance page 25 citing [Fisman and Miguel, 2006] for a measure of corrupt
cultural norms by looking at parking violations by diplomats in New York)
and could thus also be analyzed by sociologists or cultural anthropologists.
This means that it is paramount to keep up a somewhat interdisciplinary
approach whenever talking or writing about corruption. This thesis uses
mainly the tools of economists, such as formal models or econometrics and
thus has to remember that it thereby remains incomplete. It is nevertheless
legitimate to do so as corruption creates a set of incentives to which people
respond and thereby gives economists an opportunity to contribute.
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1.3 Transition
Transition is the process of reforming a centrally planned economy to-
wards a functioning market economy. It redefines how the state and the firms
are organized and how they interact with each other. Since corruption is a
main aspect of their interaction, analyzing this phenomenon thus contributes
to the theories of industrial organization. As [Hellman et al., 2000a] points
out, there is a bi-directional relationship: the state interacts with firms, but
(and this has been less subject to scientific investigation) at the same time
firms influence the state. They can exert influence on public officials and
collude with them to extract advantages, thereby changing the rules of the
game, as mentioned above in the definition of corruption.
1.4 Analysis of Corruption applied to Transi-
tion Countries
Applying concepts used in research on corruption to economies in tran-
sition can add value to the research on corruption in general. This can be
done by setting up counterfactuals. By taking a group of countries that have
a common starting point in their economic development (as it is the case for
former communist countries) and looking at the diverging paths in terms of
the possible factors determining corruption, we can contribute to explaining
the different outcomes in terms of corruption among those countries (e.g.
[Kaufmann, 1998]). [Karasulu, 2003] notes that “[i]n the post-communist
world, the process of economic transition not only unmasked corruption, but
created fertile ground for the (unmasked) corruption’s being more systemic.”
Others, like [Treisman, 2003] argued that corruption in transition coun-
tries is not much different from corruption in other less-developed countries.
Yet, also Treisman notes that “[p]ostcommunist countries have followed strik-
ingly different trajectories. In some, the first postcommunist governments
liberalized the economy and focused on providing public services; in others,
politics descended into a competitive struggle over rents; in yet others, an
authoritarian cartel kept such rents - and the population too - under strict
control” (ibid).
1.5 28 countries
By “transition economies” we mean specifically 28 countries: the group of
the ten New Member States (NMS) of the European Union (Bulgaria, Czech
1.6. CORRUPTION IN TRANSITION COUNTRIES - THE BIG
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Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia,
Slovenia), the twelve Commonwealth of Independent States countries (Arme-
nia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan), the five former Yu-
goslav republics that are not EU member states (Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia,
Montenegro, Serbia3) and Albania.
1.6 Corruption in Transition Countries - The
big picture
To get a rough sense of the levels of corruption prevailing around the
globe, one can look at the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) calculated
annually by Transparency International (www.transparency.org). The CPI
attributes to each country an index number between 0 (“highly corrupt”)
and 10 (“highly clean”). Table 1.1 highlights the difference in Corruption
Perception Index among three groups of Transition Countries. EU Member
States have the highest CPIs, followed by Former Yugoslav countries (other
than Slovenia), whereas CIS countries and Albania have the lowest. The
smallest CPI observed was 1.8 (Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan), which is almost
on the bottom of the global ranking, too, and is comparable to the scores of
Zimbabwe or the Democratic Republic of Congo. The best CPI was Slovenia’s
6.7, which ranks only two places behind France and six behind the United
States.
Global evidence shows a strong correlation between a country’s GDP and
its CPI. This can also be confirmed for the case of Transition Countries.
Yet, we can also see a strong variation and a significantly different level
of corruption among some countries who have similar GDPs per capita. For
instance, Poland and Russia have an almost identical GDP per capita (around
$12,000), yet Russia has a CPI of 2.1 (just like Kenya or Bangladesh) whereas
Poland’s score is 4.6 (in comparison: Italy’s score is 4.8). At the same time,
Slovakia has about the same level of corruption as the Czech Republic but
a much lower GDP per capita. In general, as Figure 1.2 indicates, CIS
countries seem to evolve along a different path than the New Member States
and former Yugoslav republics4. A simple linear regression yields a constant
of about 1.98 and a coefficient of 0.18 (GDP per capita being measured in
3Kosovo is not included as its independence is not universally recognized (yet) and
because, due to the recentness of its establishment, data is hardly available specifically for
Kosovo.
4CPI data from Transparency International (2008), GDP data from the IMF (estimates
for 2008; for Montenegro, the CIA World Factbook estimate for 2008 was used).
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Figure 1.2: CPI and GDP per capita for 28 transition economies in 2008
thousands). The results are similar when we use the HDI from the UN’s 2008
report5 (which includes HDI values for 2006) instead of GDP per capita. The
constant is -11.53 and the coefficient 18.63 (note that the average among HDIs
is much smaller than among GDPs). Yet, in this setting, Poland (which, as
mentioned above, has about the same GDP per capita as Russia) is on rank
number five in terms of HDI (as compared to number 10 in the GDP ranking).
The HDI is an average of three indices: life expectancy, education (itself a
weighted average of adult literacy rate and gross enrollment index) and GDP
per capita. This might mean that education is a factor related to corruption.
The reason for this might be the fact that education is actually more of an
indicator of the quality of a country’s institutions than GDP is.
Corruption thus seems not only to be a purely economic-developmental
issue, but also a policy and institutional problem. If we assume that Poland
and Russia were more or less at the same level of corruption before 1989, then
something must have gone “wrong” in Russia during the transition period.
We will therefore have to look at the various economic transition processes
in those countries and - by comparing them - try to find the causes for why
one country ended up being more corrupt than the other.
5http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDI_2008_EN_Tables.pdf
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Figure 1.3: CPI and HDI for 28 transition economies
1.7 Research questions and structure of this
thesis
This thesis tries to accomplish several things. It first gives a brief overview
of the existing literature on the economic analysis of corruption (Chapter
2), and then presents three formal models in detail (Chapter 3). From the
literature and the models, a number of hypotheses arise (Chapter 4). The
next step then is to look at how those hypotheses could be tested empirically:
A recurring issue is the illegality and secrecy of corruption, which will have
huge implications on how this topic can be approached empirically. Chapter 5
therefore presents some of the available data and deliberates on the usefulness
of these datasets. Chapter 6 then tries to test the formulated hypotheses
using the data presented. The last section concludes by summarizing some
of the determinants of corruption in transition economies and gives some
thought on how data could be improved to achieve more significant results.
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Table 1.1: CPI2008: Estimates as grand mean/intercept and marginal im-
pacts
Variable Coefficient
(Std. Err.)
EXYU 0.050
(0.286)
EU 1.283∗∗
(0.193)
CIS -1.233∗∗
(0.154)
other -0.150
(0.692)
Grand 3.550∗∗
(0.133)
N 28
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
Chapter 2
Literature survey
There is a large literature on the relationship between corruption and
development. See for instance [Bardhan, 1997] or [Mauro, 1999]. Since this
thesis focuses on transition economies and not so much on developing coun-
tries, this literature is left out of this survey.
2.1 Theoretical foundations
2.1.1 Efficiency-increasing corruption
Some papers take corruption as given and look at the second-best out-
come. Proponents of the view that bribe payments “grease the wheels” of
bureaucracy as described in the Equilibrium Queuing Model of Bribery in
[Lui, 1985] argue that firms that pay more bribes spend less time in the
waiting queue for scarce government goods.
Yet, this view is strongly contested in [Kaufmann and Wei, 2000], which
argues that in a general equilibrium (unlike the partial Nash equilibrium
in [Lui, 1985]) bureaucratic harassment is endogenous. They also provide
empirical evidence showing that bribe payments are not associated with less
delay and lower burden, though they assert that paying bribes can be rational
for individual firms in a corrupt environment.
2.1.2 Efficiency-detrimenting corruption
Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny’s often-quoted 1993 paper on cor-
ruption, [Shleifer and Vishny, 1993], tries to formally show (a) that the level
of corruption is determined by the structure of government institutions and
the political process, with weak governments inducing ultra-high corruption
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levels, and (b) that due to its illegality and hence the need for secrecy, corrup-
tion is much more distortionary and costly than taxation. This is seen as part
of the explanation of why in some less developed countries, corruption is so
high and so costly to development. As described in more detail in Chapter 3,
they introduce a simple model of a government produced good which is sold
by a government bureaucrat, who has the opportunity to restrict the quan-
tity of the good that is sold. He or she can than turn over the official price of
the good to the government (no theft) or simply hide the sale (theft). They
furthermore distinguish three cases: one where corrupt agencies constitute
a joint monopoly, one where they act as independent monopolists, and one
with perfect competition among different suppliers of the same government
good. [Shleifer and Vishny, 1993] give plausible explanations for patterns of
corruption in Russia. Yet, it is not addressed why countries in Central and
Eastern Europe or former Yugoslav countries experienced a very different
development than Russia and other former Soviet republics. This was ad-
dressed five years later in [Shleifer and Vishny, 1998a], where they look at the
early transition process, especially the time of the so-called shock therapies
in several countries. In particular, they compare differences in development
in two seemingly similar countries: Poland and Russia.
Apart from the models presented in chapter 3, there are also formal
approaches to corruption specifically relating to transition. For instance,
[Basu and Li, 1998] are puzzled by the observation that countries in tran-
sition often experience an increase in corruption at the same time as an
increase in growth, which is counterfactual to the theories of the destructive
effects of corruption as well as to theories stating that corruption disappears
with economic growth. By using a quite elaborate model, they describe how
corruption levels can be reduced in the long run and thereby also the founda-
tions for current high growth be laid if controls for corruption are temporarily
relaxed and the government thereby secures support for its reform effort. A
key to this rationale is that bureaucracies are not seen as uniform, but as a
sequence of generations of bureaucrats, where one generation can be “bought
out” to the detriment of the following generation.
Other theoretical papers look at the effect of corruption on competition.
[Emerson, 2006] hypothesizes that if a government agent controls access to
a formal market, he or she has a self-interest in demanding a bribe payment
that serves to limit the number of firms. This is because only in an oligopolis-
tic market firms earn profits, of which the public official can then demand
a share. In this model, the probability of detection depends on the amount
of the bribe payment and the number of firms that pay it. The model has
multiple equilibria, with one being characterized by high corruption and low
competition and another characterized by low corruption and high compe-
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tition. This result is also confirmed empirically by using perceptions-based
indexes for corruption and competition.
2.1.3 Control rights
Some data reveal that there are firms which need to pay more bribes
than others. An explanation given e.g. by [Svensson, 2003] is that “offi-
cials’ opportunity to extract bribes, i.e., their opportunity to influence the
firms’ business decisions and cash flows, differs across sectors and locations.
With private firms, these control rights stem from the existing regulatory
system and the discretion public officials have in implementing, executing,
and enforcing rules and benefits that affect firms, such as business regula-
tions, licensing requirements, permissions, taxes, exemptions, and public-
goods provision” (ibid, 209). They also determine the threat point in the
negotiations between public officials and firms. How much control over a
firm can be exercised by a public official cannot be measured, but a firm’s
required or voluntary dealings with the public sector can be. Formal models
are described in [Shleifer and Vishny, 1994] and [Svensson, 2003].
[Ades and Tella, 1997a] argue that active industrial policy transfers rents
to firms in favored sectors and that “bureaucrats with control rights over
those firms can create mechanisms to extract some of those rents through
bribes” (ibid, 1024). The total effect of industrial policy on investment can
be decomposed into two effect, a positive direct effect and a negative indirect
effect through corruption.
2.2 Empirical methodology
As, by definition, corruption is something illegal, obtaining data on it is
a big issue in studies on this topic. It requires a great amount of creativity
to find pieces of evidence that might hint at corruption taking place.
[Fisman and Miguel, 2006] take a look at how corruption is embodied in
cultural norms of diplomats at the United Nations headquarters in New York
by looking at their parking violations. Thereby they construct a revealed
preference measure of government officials’ corruption based on real-world
behavior taking place in the same setting. They find that diplomats from
high corruption countries have significantly more parking violations.
In another paper, [Fisman and Wei, 2004] compare Hong Kong’s reported
exports to China at the product level and China’s reported imports from
Hong Kong and thereby design an indicator for the laxity of the rule of law.
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Fisman also tried to estimate the value of political connections in a case
study on Indonesia under Suharto ([Fisman, 2001]. Indonesia has a highly
centralized and stable political structure, which made it possible to con-
struct a credible index of political connectedness (ibid, 1095). He does so
by taking into account rumors on Suharto’s health during his final years in
office as an indicator for the likeliness of his death and compared the returns
of firms with differing degrees of political exposure. During such episodes
of negative rumors, he shows that “in every case the returns of shares of
politically dependent firms were considerably lower than the returns of less-
dependent firms [and that] the magnitude of this differential effect is highly
correlated with the net return on the Jakarta Stock Exchange Composite
Index. [...] Well-connected firms will suffer more, relative to less-connected
firms, in reaction to a more serious rumor. [...] Results suggest that a large
percentage of a well-connected firm’s value may be derived from political con-
nections.” (ibid, 1096). As a measure of political connectedness he uses the
1995 Suharto Dependency Index developed by the Castle Group, a consulting
firm in Jakarta. The lack of such an index for transition economies makes a
comparable study for those countries quite impossible, even though the high
concentration of firms and their links to only a few oligarchs in Russia would
invite to perform a similar analysis. For instance, it would probably be possi-
ble to establish links between Boris Yeltsin and large Russian firms and then
look at effects of Yeltsin’s resignation in 2000 or his death in 2007 on those
firms. [Faccio, 2004] also studies political connections of firms and defines a
typology of three types of connectedness: (a) connections with members of
parliament (at least one top-director of the firm sits in the national parlia-
ment, or at least one shareholder is a member of parliament), (b) connections
with a minister or head of state (as director, large shareholder or through a
relative), and (c) close relations to a top official (which lacks the definitional
objectivity of the other connection types). Faccio concludes that “connec-
tions are particularly common in countries with higher levels of corruption,
countries imposing restrictions on foreign investments by their residents, and
countries with more transparent systems [that is, where connections are easier
to identify, PCH]. Connections are less common in countries with regulations
that set more rigorous limits on political conflicts of interest.” [Faccio, 2004,
13]
2.2.1 Causality
Much of the debate revolves around the question whether there is a causal-
ity between corruption and economic growth (or more precisely: the level of
GDP). Since there is an obvious link between those two, the discussion is
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mainly about what caused what. Authors like Johann Graf Lambsdorff of
the University of Passau, who produces the Corruption Perceptions Index for
Transparency International, basically claims that corruption produces low
growth [Graf Lambsdorff, 2008], whereas others, such as Daniel Treisman in
his cross-national study on the causes of corruption argue that corruption
is poverty-driven and disappears when countries develop [Treisman, 2000].
[Gundlach and Paldam, 2000] contribute to this debate by using a somewhat
unusual approach. They use instrumental variables to identify the long-run
direction of causality - and do so by using prehistoric measures of biogeog-
raphy. From those measures they deduce corruption-free incomes and then
show that these incomes explain cross-country patterns of corruption just
as well as the actual cross-country pattern of incomes. They conclude that
all long-run causality is from income to corruption, which also means that
corruption vanishes as countries get rich. They nevertheless explicitly do not
rule out a short-run reverse causality.
2.3 Corruption in transition economies
[Levin and Satarov, 1999] link the prevalence of high levels of corruption
in Russia to its communist past and subsequent bad development in the early
transition process. Even though transition introduced a market system, pre-
transition institutions and ways of doing business that use the weakness of
the state for private profit remained in place. Competition thus is mainly for
rents. The boundaries between politics and private business are ill-defined. It
is estimated “that the sum of losses inflicted by corruption exceeds the com-
bined expenditures on science, education, health care, and art allocated in
the government budget” (ibid). Criminal groups in some branches of industry
like the oil and gas or the mining of rare metals industries, spend up to half
of their actual revenues on paying bribes to officials at various levels. The
losses from improper uses of government funds amounted to billions of dollars
in 1997. Small entrepreneurs across Russia are estimated to pay a minimum
of half a billion U.S. dollars per month for bribes to officials and some ten
percent of total revenues in small- and middle-size businesses are taken by
corruption (ibid). Setting up a business can be very costly: permissions from
about fifty officials are required and thus constitute a large potential for bribe
payments. As combined corruption-related payments seem to be in the range
of US$ 10 to 20 billion a year, investments to reduce corruption would easily
be socially profitable. The rise of the shadow economy led to a reduction in
tax collection and a weakened government budget, at the same time, infor-
mal firms have to pay bribes in order to silence tax collectors. “Corruption
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overheads” put a burden on companies or the state when it tries to provide
public goods (ibid).
“Corruption, its scale, dynamics, and specific features, is a consequence
of the general political and socioeconomic problems of the transition from
socialism” [Levin and Satarov, 1999, 116]. The process of transition would
have required a division of labor between free market agents and state in-
stitutions, which should create the conditions for the normal functioning of
the economy. Instead, administrative bodies, especially at the regional level,
“continued to play on the economic field according to the rules that they
established for themselves” (ibid, 117). While rapid and radical changes oc-
curred in the 1990s in Russia, the majority of state officials nevertheless kept
their posts. A negative selection took place, meaning that those who were
most likely to adhere to Soviet patterns of state interference in all aspects of
life and those who considered a governmental administrative post as means
for their personal enrichment remained in state bureaucracies.
The speed of transition and the political risk related to it disencouraged
long-term investments and led to an economic behavior that was more inter-
ested in extremely short-term goals. People who acted in this way were also
likely to seek profit by means of corruption.
Due to the economic crises in the 1990s, the state had to increase taxes,
thus again fostering the development of a shadow economy.
During the transition period, legislation lags behind the speed of reform,
which means that the first steps of privatization were made in the absence
of any legal regulations or strict controls. “Economic liberalization was com-
bined with, first, obsolete principles of state control over resource distribution
and, second, with the absence of legal norms regulating new activity” (ibid,
118). Russia’s historical lack of well-established democratic political tra-
ditions and of significant opposition enabled political figures to trade their
political capital for economic gain. Furthermore, in Soviet times, protection
was sought in party committees and not in courts, suing others was very
unusual. The judiciary system is therefore traditionally weak.
Privatizations of state property were a serious cause of corruption: includ-
ing state officials in the pool of shareholders was a widespread practice. The
cost of privatized property was underestimated, tender conditions were ma-
nipulated, enterprise and state officials engaged in mass purchases of shares
of enterprises through trustees (ibid).
It is estimated that around half of all decisions regarding state credits
or the state distribution of state budgetary resources are accompanied by
bribes. The lack of resources in the budget allowed officials to decide who
will be the first to obtain financing. During administrative reforms, public
officials regularly expressed the wish for the right to issue licenses (ibid).
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Since the time of the Soviet Union, the number of convictions for corrupt
acts decreased by 80%, even though Russia’s population is smaller than that
of the USSR by 40%. “The probability that a defendant will end up behind
bars after a case is begun by the prosecutor’s office does not exceed 0.08”
(ibid, 126). Law enforcement agencies fail in their fight with corruption for
three reasons:
1. Criminal prosecution cannot change large-scale corruption alone, since
corruption is a systemic problem and not only a criminal one.
2. The quality of work of the law enforcement agencies is low, as the level
of professionalism is low and those agencies are affected by corruption
themselves.
3. The law enforcement system alone cannot cope with the problem, but
needs the combined efforts of the state and society. (ibid)
[Treisman, 2003] examines whether transition countries are particularly
corrupt and why some are more corrupt than others. He finds that they
are on average somewhat more corrupt than others, though most of the dif-
ference can be explained by their relatively low economic development and
limited history of democracy. The variation between countries can be ex-
plained by factors that were already fixed at the beginning of transition,
namely 1989 economic development, years under communism, Protestant
share of population, and natural resource endowments. Furthermore, polit-
ical decentralization, political instability (during transition) and executive-
parliament polarization do also contribute to some extent. Other aspects
do not have a statistical significance: the extent of democracy, trade, and
indicators of progress in economic and legal reforms. Based on these results,
he criticizes that research focused too much on idiosyncratic features of the
transition years and too little on underlying factors that explain corruption
worldwide. For his calculations, he used the perceptions-based indexes from
Transparency International (CPI) and the World Bank as well as the BEEPS
dataset. These datasets will all be described in further detail in Chapter 5.
2.3.1 Comparison to other regions in the world
Corruption is generally linked to low economic development. Since tran-
sition economies, particularly those further to the East are relatively less-
developed, this accounts for much of the observed levels of corruption. All of
those 28 share the burden of not having been colonized by the British empire
at any time in history. For many economic indicators, including corruption,
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ties to the British tradition have a positive effect (see, e.g. [Treisman, 2003].
In fact, the world’s largest economy (the United States) is a British spin-off,
while the largest democracy in the world (India) experienced over a hundred
years of British rule. The 2008 average CPI for the group of transition coun-
tries was 3.55, the world’s average was 4.02. Treisman generally considers the
specific effect of postcommunism on corruption to be small. So, according
to him, “for the most part, Uzbekistan has high perceived corruption today
for the same reasons as Pakistan or Paraguay,” while “the main causes of
Russia’s corruption are the same as those of Paraguay’s” (ibid).
Nevertheless, the transition process brought many changes and also many
opportunities for corruption unique to transition, which legitimizes an anal-
ysis of corruption in those countries. The introduction mentioned the differ-
ence in corruption between Russia and Poland: in fact, even Treisman’s skep-
tical to transition-specific explanations analysis explains only about 40 per-
cent of the gap between those to countries. This gap is closed by adding prime
ministerial turnover, parliament-executive polarization, Russia’s greater po-
litical decentralization, and the less severe (1990s) economic crisis in Poland.
2.3.2 Privatization
As hinted at above, the way how privatizations took place in transition
economies might be an important determinant of levels and patterns of cor-
ruption. Privatization can mean a combination of two changes undertaken
by a reformer. “The first is turnover of control from spending politicians
to managers, often referred to as corporatization. Such a turnover can be
implemented by a strong reform government that effectively suppresses the
ministries and the bureaucracy, as happened in the Czech Republic. Alter-
natively, such a turnover can happen more spontaneously, as the power of
bureaucracy to protect its control rights diminishes. Such a slow turnover of
control form politicians to managers occurred in Russia in the early 1990s”
[Shleifer and Vishny, 1998b, 143] The second change is the reduction of cash
flow ownership by the treasury and the increase of cash flow ownership by
managers and outside shareholders (ibid).
However, the process of transferring assets to private ownership itself
gives opportunities to corrupt acts. Those corrupt incentives can be compa-
rable to those that arise in the award of contracts and concessions: bidders
for a public company can bribe officials in the privatization authority or at
the top of government. “Bribes may be solicited for inclusion on the list
of prequalified bidders, and firms may pay to restrict the number of other
bidders” [Rose-Ackerman, 1999]. But there are also corrupt incentives that
are more specific to the privatization process, with three important factors
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[Rose-Ackerman, 1999]:
1. Valuation of assets and specification of the tax and regulatory
regime: Corrupt insiders might have knowledge not available to the
public about the company and sell this information to the highest bid-
der. They can also give corrupt firms special treatment in the bidding
process. The firm might simply be awarded to those with the best po-
litical connections [Rose-Ackerman, 1999]. “Sales, at unstated prices,
have sometimes been made to dubious purchasers such as ruling party
politicians and others lacking in business experience” (Nellis and Kikeri
1989, 668, cited in [Rose-Ackerman, 1999]). Privatization processes can
thus be undermined by bid-rigging by banks that both arranged and
won privatization auctions, as it was particularly the case in Russia.
2. Wrong revelation of performance to the public: “Corrupt offi-
cials may present information to the public that makes the company
look weak while revealing to favored insiders that it is actually doing
well. The insiders then are the high bidders in what appears to be an
open and above-board bidding process” [Rose-Ackerman, 1999]. Cor-
rupt bidders can also be assured of lenient regulatory oversight, while
an outsider cannot rely upon this. In ex-post evaluations such priva-
tizations look like a huge success: the newly private company achieves
higher rates of return than expected based on the wrong information
given to the public.
3. Retention of monopoly power: Bidders for a firm, as well as an im-
pecunious state, both want to assure the monopoly power of the priva-
tized firm. Through corrupt back-channels the state can give lip service
to market competition, while supporting monopolization secretly.
Additionally, firms may obtain special benefits for purchasing a public firm,
such as heavy protection (e.g. confiscatory taxes on competing production
and a monopoly on imports). But even if the privatization process is corrupt,
the result can still be a competitive private firm subject to market discipline.
It is not assured because the firm might maintain a close relationship to
the state (especially the case for public utility or transportation firms) and
because frequently the state sells off only a portion of the state firm and
thereby stays in control, giving opportunity to corrupt inside arrangements
(ibid).
[Campos and Giovannoni, 2006] and others use the term asset stripping
to describe the process of managers and politicians obtaining assets without
paying the full market price for them. They argue that it is driven by the
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interplay between the firm’s potential profitability and its ability to influence
law enforcement.
2.3.3 Tax rates
Nominal tax rates used to be very high in transition economies. This lead
to bribes and other types of tax avoidance which lead to even more avoidance
[Rose-Ackerman, 1999].
Additionally, excessive taxes force firms out of the official sector. Firms
pay bribes to avoid paying taxes or following regulations, meaning that cor-
ruption reflects payments to evade government control. If the level of taxation
and regulation is high, then bribes that are paid to get excused from paying
taxes or following regulations are greater. Tax and regulatory burdens are
therefore highly correlated with the level of corruption, which, just like regu-
lation, does not raise any revenues for the government [Johnson et al., 1997].
[Johnson et al., 1998] show that when there is more corruption and when the
rule of law is weaker, the share of the unofficial economy will be larger. This
result, though, is only valid for transition economies, and is not found in a
larger country sample. They conclude that “the effect of bureaucratic quality
and the way regulations are administered appear to be particularly strong”
(ibid, section I).
This is in line with [Auriol and Warlters, 2002] who argue that the gov-
ernment in developing countries have an incentive to raise barriers to entry
in order to maximize state revenue. Those barriers of entry create market
power and profits for the firm, which can be confiscated by the government.
2.3.4 Determinants existing already pre-1989
Some indicators that contribute to explaining corruption were already
determined at the beginning of transition (see e.g. [Treisman, 2003]). They
include:
• Share of protestants. This indicator can be ambiguous in measures:
transition economies have many people (often the majority) who de-
clare themselves as atheists. But this atheist majority can be either
originally Catholic or Protestant, the country would then stand in one
tradition rather than the other. To do this thoroughly, one would need
to have knowledge of pre-Communist Party rule religious affiliations.
• Richness in natural resources: The more natural resources a country
has, the fiercer will be the corrupt competition for rents from these
endowments.
2.3. CORRUPTION IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES 33
• Democratic history: The countries of the sample experience democracy
for their first time at different points in history. Russia turned quickly
from Tsarist feudalism to party dictatorship and only introduced a
democratic constitution in the early 1990s. On the other hand, Poland
introduced an (at the time) very progressive constitution already in
1791 as the first European country to so and the second worldwide
(after the United States).
• Number of years spent under Communist Party rule: This is to a certain
degree a corollary to the “democratic history” indicator. This indicator
though identifies effects on corruption specifically due to socialism, as
opposed to periods of monarchy or authoritarian/fascist rule.
2.3.5 Determinants arising after 1989
Other determinants developed only after the fall of the country’s Com-
munist Party (see e.g. [Treisman, 2003]):
• Civil service pay: Transition economies inherited civil pay scales from
socialist times that exceeded business sector wages. But pay has fallen
not only relative to private sector wages but also to civil service wages
in the past. In Bulgaria, civil servants suffered a fall of 17.7 percent
per year during the period 1989-1992 [Rose-Ackerman, 1999].
• Democratization: One would expect lower levels of corruption in demo-
cratic societies. A first glance at CPI data also confirms this assump-
tion - though the highly authoritarian and unreformed regimes in Turk-
menistan, Belarus and Uzbekistan at some points in time do not have
score much worse than relatively more democratic countries such as
Romania, Macedonia or Croatia. In one year (2003), Belarus achieved
a CPI score of 4.2 and was even “cleaner” than the Czech Republic and
Slovakia. Due to the weakness of the data, Treisman “remain[s] ag-
nostic” on the possible interpretation that partial reform is worse than
none at all.
• Presidential vs. parliamentary regime
• Political decentralization. The literature sees mixed effects of political
decentralization.
• Political instability
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• Generational change at the head of government/state: This indicator
relates to whether old elites or rulers staid in power, or whether there
has been a renewal of people in government.
• Polarization between executive and legislature
• Speed of transition
• Legal extensiveness and effectiveness
• Openness to foreign trade
• State intervention
Legal system
Many papers address the question of rule of law and its interaction with
corruption. For instance, Jain presents the following example:
“The level of corruption in a country with an ineffective legal
system may begin to rise in response to, say, an external shock.
The political elite may find the increased income from corrup-
tion irresistible. Once corrupted, the elite will attempt to reduce
the effectiveness of the legal and judicial systems through ma-
nipulation of resources allocation and appointments to key posi-
tions. Reduced resources will make it difficult for the legal system
to combat corruption, thus allowing corruption to spread even
more.” [Jain, 2001, 2]
Several papers confirm earlier results suggesting that “civil liberties represent
an effective means of controlling corruption” [Herzfeld and Weiss, 2003, 629],
that is, that in a fixed-effect model (on the usability of corruption indexes for
time series analyses, see 5.2.3) corruption significantly decreases with a higher
level of political rights and civil liberties. They also point out that while
some recent theoretical models focus on the link between past-experience of
corruption and current levels of corruption, this has not yet translated into
empirical research.
2.3.6 The case of Russia and Poland
It was mentioned in the introduction (section 1.6) that Poland and Russia
developed from a same starting point, arrived at a similar stage of develop-
ment, yet diverge in some aspects, such as corruption.
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In their paper on government in transition, [Shleifer and Vishny, 1998a]
elaborate a little bit on those two countries: At the beginning of transition,
both were industrial economies and both “faced substantial disruption from
the collapse of COMECON and other trade following the demise of the Soviet
Union. Indeed, both economies were in shambles at the beginning of reforms,
overwhelmed by inflation, goods shortages, and declining production” (ibid,
229).
Also in political terms, they argue, the two countries are similar: both
experience turmoil, Poland in the 1980s when it declared martial law against
the Solidarnosc movement1, and Gorbachev’s government facing strong oppo-
sition, especially from what could be called conservative communists within
the Red Army. “After communism collapsed, both countries moved to frag-
mented, rapidly changing party systems and “semi-presidential” regimes, in
which a conflict between president and legislature was built from the start.
Both were led in their transition by charismatic, populist presidents commit-
ted first and foremost to the destruction of Communism. Yet, despite these
similarities as of 1990, the two countries’ reforms had had very different re-
sults as of 1996.” (ibid)
They see the reason for this in the fact that, despite similar economic
reforms, the Russian government continued to retain substantial political
control over economic life “and, moreover, uses this control to pursue preda-
tory policies toward business” (ibid), that is, political transition in Poland
was much faster than in Russia. In fact, Russia retained old politicians and
created inappropriate incentives for them.
A political scientist might want to add to Shleifer and Vishny’s analysis,
that transition in Poland originated from Solidarnosc, that is, from an op-
position movement, whereas Russia’s transition was actually started by the
Communist-turned-Capitalist elite. Solidarnosc obviously had a high inter-
est in replacing Communist Party officials by members of the labor union
movement, while Communist Party of the Soviet Union officials did not face
such an alternative.
1Though, unlike [Shleifer and Vishny, 1998b] describe it, martial law did not directly
lead to the total demise of the Communist Party.
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Chapter 3
Models of Corruption
Theoretical models can look at a variety of questions arising in the eco-
nomic analysis of corruption:
• Is it optimal for a benevolent principal to design a corruption-free bu-
reaucracy? [Aidt, 2003, 635] Answering by no means that corruption
can be an integrated part of an optimally designed institution. Corrup-
tion thus persists when the cost of eliminating it is too high. Benev-
olence here means that the government wants to implement socially
beneficial policies and attempts to optimize the working of its institu-
tions.
• On the other hand, a non-benevolent state with weak political institu-
tions favors the establishment of epidemic corruption. The Grabbing
Hand theory formulated by [Shleifer and Vishny, 1993] introduces the
concept of governments regulating entry to markets because of their
corruption potential. The general principle from this theory is that
“economic policies are adopted, not to eliminate market failures but
because they create corruption opportunities: inefficient policy and
corruption are equilibrium phenomena and are jointly determined by
underlying economic and political institutions” [Aidt, 2003, 643].
• Furthermore, corruption can, as the third model presented argues, cor-
rupt. This means that more public officials will engage more in corrup-
tion the more their colleagues do.
3.1 Benevolent principal
To look at the cost for a benevolent government to establish a corruption-
free bureaucracy, a model for corruption in tax collection was formulated by
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[Aidt, 2003].
The government assigns an agent with the task of collection taxes. His/her
job is to investigate whether a firm is liable for taxation. The firm is liable
to pay taxes if it had a positive profit, that is, if pi > 0. The probability of
achieving such a profit is 1 > h > 0. For simplification, the tax rate t the
firm has to pay if its profits get reported to the government is assumed to be
100 percent. So t = pi.
But the firm can bribe the tax collector so that he or she does not report
the firm’s profits. The cost to the firm is thus not pi anymore, but b < pi.
The government, which, after all, is devoted to maximizing tax revenue,
has a mechanism to detect corrupt tax collectors. The probability to discover
them is p.
If the tax collector is discovered, he or she loses his or her job and has to
pay a penalty of f > 0. Also the firm gets punished and has to pay a fee of
g > 0.
The tax collector also has an outside option of working in the private
sector, which would pay a wage w0 > 0, instead of w received as public official.
They furthermore show two different degrees of willingness to be corrupt: a
fraction γ refuses corrupt acts (for “moral” reasons), while a portion 1− γ is
willing to accept bribes in exchange for not reporting firms to the government,
if this proves to maximize their utility.
All actors involved are considered to be risk-neutral.
If the firm bribes the tax collector, its gain is pi−pg, since it can keep the
earned profit, but faces a risk of having to pay the penalty. The firm thus
engages in bribery if
pi > pg (3.1)
Depending on the firm’s and tax collector’s respective bargaining power,
and assuming that their are transaction costs involved, such that the tax
collector only gets to keep a fraction k ∈ [0; 1] of the bribe, the bribe will be
b = max {k(pi − pg), 0} (3.2)
For the tax collector, the expected gain is larger than his or her “honest”
wage if:
(1− p)(w + b) + p(w0 − f) > w (3.3)
He or she accepts the bribe if
(1− p)b+ p(w0 − w − f) > 0 (3.4)
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Four of these variables can be more or less easily designed by the govern-
ment: it can set the public officials’ wage w, the detection system p, and the
punishments f and g.
3.1.1 The government’s optimal choice
Efficiency wage
Leaving the monitoring system and legal remedies unchanged, the gov-
ernment can set the wage such that no more corruption arises (f can thus
be zero):
(1− p)b+ p(w0 − w
e) = 0 (3.5)
⇔ (1− p)b = p(−w0 + w
e) (3.6)
⇔
(1− p)b
p
= −w0 + w
e (3.7)
⇔ we = w0 +
(1− p)b
p
(3.8)
3.1.2 Testing the model
Since this model allows us to make conclusions about possible levels of
corruption without actually observing corrupt acts, it is at least theoretically
possible to empirically test the model. Wages of public officials should theo-
retically be easy to obtain as pay scales are determined by law; punishment
is defined by law as well. The only problem is to estimate the efficiency of
the detection system.
3.2 The Grabbing Hand model
The corruption network can be organized in different ways. In the Soviet
Union, corruption was pervasive, but the briber had a guarantee that he or
she will receive the government good and will not have to pay any further
bribes in the future. In post-Soviet Russia, numerous officials need to be
bribed to get that good and it is not sure that, after having paid a bribe to
one official, another government official, or even the first one, will charge an
additional bribe. A third regime would be one where no bribes are charged
at all.
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3.2.1 One government good and the official as monop-
olist
The Grabbing Hand theory, as formulated by [Shleifer and Vishny, 1993]
uses a model of one government-produced good, such as a passport,or a right
to use a government road, or an import license. It tries to examine the
implications of those three regimes for their level of corruption and for the
effects of corruption on economic activity and asks why bribery might be
much more costly than taxation.
The good is assumed to be homogeneous and is demanded by private
agents according to a demand curve D(p). The good is sold by a government
official who can restrict the quantity of the good that is sold (this corresponds
in practice to a long delay or an imposition of many requirements). He can
do so without fear of detection or punishment. The situation is thus basically
analogous to a monopoly.
The official government price of the good is p, the cost of production is
irrelevant to the official, since it is the government that produces the good
and not the official.
Then, two cases can be distinguished. In the case without theft, the
official turns over the official price of the good to the government. The
marginal cost of providing the good is therefore p, that is, (s)he receives a
bribe, but has to pay p to the government. In the case with theft, (s)he
does not turn over anything to the government and hides the sale. Here, the
price the buyer pays equals the bribe and might be lower than the official
price (e.g. a custom official lets goods pass through the border for less than
the official duty). The marginal cost is thus zero. Depending on the case,
corruption can either raise the total price of the good, or reduce it. Buyers
will thus prefer corruption with theft.
If the official cannot price discriminate between buyers, then (s)he will
set the marginal revenue equal to the marginal cost. The official will create a
shortage at the official price and then collect bribes so as to clear the market
for the good.
In this model, especially in the case without theft, bribes act like a com-
modity tax, with the difference that taxes are kept by the government and
not by its officials. The introduction of detection and punishment changes
the model quantitatively, but not qualitatively: The level of the bribe will
decrease and the quantity provided increase if the expected penalty increases
with the level of the bribe. The level of bribe increases while the output
decreases if the expected penalty rises in the number of people (s)he charges
a bribe (that is, the more people are charged a bribe, the higher the proba-
bility that somebody will complain) and stay the same if the probability of
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detection and the penalty are independent of the bribe and the number of
people who pay it. Depending on the expected punishment and the benefits
in both cases, the public official will choose whether he or she steals from the
government or not.
Corruption spreads because of the competition both among the officials
and among the customers. If the government officials who assign other offi-
cials to their jobs are corrupt, too, then the job distribution could be seen as
an auction mechanism, where people pay to get the lucrative job of a bribe
collector. In such a system, “honest” officials could not afford to get such a
job, whereas those who are more efficient at collecting bribes will get the job.
Such a competition scheme will ensure that maximal bribes are collected.
In the case with theft, there will also be strong competition among bribers.
Since getting the government good gives an advantage over one’s competi-
tors, all players in the market have a strong incentive to engage in bribing.
In that case, no buyer has an incentive to report on the official, since paying
the bribe might still be better than having to pay p. Corruption thus spreads
if theft from the government is easy to implement and to sustain.
3.2.2 Several goods and competition among public offi-
cials
The model above is incomplete in the sense that usually a buyer needs
several complementary government goods to conduct his or her business and
that usually these goods need to be obtained from several officials or agen-
cies. During Soviet times, bribes could simply be channeled through the
local Communist Party offices and deliverance was guaranteed by the party
bureaucracy. Nowadays in Russia, the sellers of complementary government
goods act independently. They set their own bribes independently and max-
imize their individual revenue and not total revenue.
If a joint monopolist agency sets the bribe prices p1 and p2 of two gov-
ernment goods, x1 and x2 are the quantities of these goods sold and the
official prices (equal to the monopolist’s marginal costs) are denoted MC1
and MC2, then the per unit bribes then are p1 −MC1 and p2 −MC2. The
joint monopolist agency sets p1 at which
MR1 +MR2
dx2
dx1
= MC1 (3.9)
with MR1 and MR2 being the marginal revenues from the sale of goods
1 and 2, respectively. For complementary goods, dx2
dx1
> 0, and so at the
optimum, MR1 < MC1. The agency keeps the bribe on good 1 low to
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expand the demand for good 2 and thus to raise its profits from bribes on
good 2. Equally, the agency keeps down the price of good 2. If goods 1 and 2
are allocated by independent agencies, each agency takes the other’s output
as given, with dx2
dx1
= 0. At the agency’s optimum, MRi = MCi. The per
unit bribe is thus higher and the output lower, than in the joint monopolist
optimum. This means that the agencies hurt each other by ignoring the effect
of their respective raising their bribe on demand for the complementary good
and as well hurt the private buyers of government goods.
A third scenario would be one where the same good can be provided by
two or more government agencies. This case is straight-forward: competition
among suppliers of the good will reduce the level of bribes down to zero. Table
3.1 summarizes the different outcomes.
Level of bribes Total amount of
revenues collected
Case 1: joint monopoly intermediate highest
Case 2: independent monopolists highest intermediate
Case 3: competition lowest lowest
Table 3.1: Bribe levels in different scenarios
The sometimes-quoted analogy made by [Shleifer and Vishny, 1993] is
that of a tollbooth. A car might need to pay one toll to use the entire
road (joint monopoly), pay toll at every town the road goes through (in-
dependent monopolists), or the car’s driver might have the choice between
several booths that all sell the right to use that particular road (competitive
case).
Collusion of monopolists was easy to sustain in the Soviet Union as the
KGB had a large surveillance network and because the ruling elite was rela-
tively small, thus facilitating the detection of deviations. Russia in the 1990s
and 2000s does not have a central government strong enough to fire or pe-
nalize corrupt rackets in the provinces or even in the capital, which is why
independent monopolists easily established.
The policy recommendation from that model is clearly to produce compe-
tition between bureaucrats while intensively monitoring theft (as competitive
pressure might increase theft from the government, even though it reduces
bribes).
It was mentioned above that corruption has a similar effect to taxation.
But, since corruption is per definition illegal and must be kept more or less
secret, the distortionary effect of corruption can be larger. Corruption will
rather take place in sectors where the probability of detection will be lower
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and officials will use their powers to induce substitution into the goods on
which bribes can be collect more safely and discretely. This can create very
high efficiency losses. Public officials might have to keep their corrupt activ-
ities secret, but also the government might want to cover up corrupt deeds
taking place in their country by preventing outsiders (be they foreign in-
vestors or locals) from entering.
3.2.3 Testing the model
Unlike the tax collector model from section 3.1, this model can only be
tested empirically by using perceptions-based surveys. “Hard data” that can
be used includes the number of permits needed to set up a business, the
number of days it takes, and such.
3.3 Self-reinforcing corruption
The model of self-reinforcing corruption, as [Andvig and Moene, 1990]
formulated it, brings us back to the tax collector agency model described
above. This time, there is not only a corrupt tax collector, but also an
auditor who supervises the tax collector. If the tax collector gets caught by
the auditor, he or she gets fired. But the auditor can also be corrupt. In
that case, the tax collector can prevent the punishment by paying a bribe b.
The tax collector’s probability of being detected is p. The proportion of
corrupt auditors is equal to the proportion of corrupt tax collectors and is
again defined as 1− γ.
The briber does not know which public official is corrupt and which one
not. The probability of finding such a corrupt official after N trials is (1 −
γ)N−1γ. The average number of required trials until a corrupt official is found
is thus E(N) = 1
γ
. The cost to the briber i (be it moral or real) for trying
to give a bribe is qi. If a corrupt service is obtained for a bribe b, then the
excess profit is pii(b), with pi′i(b) < 0. The expected profits of bribing can thus
be written as Pi = pii(b)−
qi
γ
. The participation constraint (PC) is therefore
Pi > 0. If the moral costs are sufficiently low, this PC can be fulfilled even
for agents with a small pii(b). Demand for corrupt acts is now proportional
to the number of private agents with Pi > 0: D = D( b︸︷︷︸
−
, γ
︸︷︷︸
+
).
The long run relationship between b and the level of demand for corrup-
tion γ can be derived from the equation γ = D(b, γ), which gives b = E(γ)
at he long run demand curve. Thus, E ′ = db
dγ
= 1−Dγ
Db
, with Db < 0 and
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1 − Dγ ≤≥ 0. The long run demand curve can hence be upward sloping,
with supply directly inducing demand.
The bureaucrats, on the other hand, have utility functions which are
linear in money and receive w > 0 per period more than they would receive
in the private sector. But they are heterogeneous with respect to the costs
(moral and organizational) of supplying corrupt services. The official’s time
horizon is infinite and (s)he discounts future incomes with the discount factor
β = 1
1+r
. If b is the bribe, ci official i’s cost of supplying corrupt services, and
b− ci + Ui(t) his or her expected gain of choosing to be corrupt in period t,
then his or her expected value of the options can be written as:
Vi(t) = w +max[b− ci + Ui(t), βVi(t+ 1)] (3.10)
The expected consequences of being corrupt depend on the probability
0 ≤ s ≤ 1 of being caught and on whether the detecting colleague’s is corrupt
or honest. If (s)he is honest and reports the official to the authorities, they
confiscate the bribe and fire the official. If the colleague is corrupt too, then
the guilty official can silence him or her by paying a bribe B. For simplicity,
we assume that B = b. Therefore,
Ui(t) = (1− s)βVi(t+ 1) + s[γ(βVi(t+ 1)−B)) + (1− γ)(−b)] (3.11)
The valuation for honest officials is thus V H = w
1−β
, that is, the present
value of future salaries. The expected present value of following a corrupt
strategy is
V ci =
w + b(1− s)− ci
1− β(1− s(1− γ))
(3.12)
A rational official chooses to be corrupt if
w
1− β
<
w + b(1− s)− ci
1− β(1− s(1− γ))
(3.13)
⇔ ci < (1− s)b−
s(1− γ)w
r
(3.14)
(1− s)b− s(1−γ)w
r
is equal to the expected money gain of corruption and
is the expected retained value of the bribe minus the expected loss of future
incomes. If we assume that the costs ci are distributed over the interval [c, c]
with a cumulative density F (·) such that F (c) = 0 and F (c = 1), then the
proportion of officials who choose to be corrupt is F ((1− s)b− s(1−γ)
r
.
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The number of corrupt bureaucrats is thus higher (i) the higher the per-
ceived fraction of corrupt bureaucrats, (ii) the higher the bribes, (iii) the
lower the salary, (iv) the lower the exogenously given detection probability,
and (v) the higher the discount rate (which can also be interpreted as the
probability of the present regime staying in power; if the regime is expected
to change, then r will be higher, thus increasing corruption).
The Nash equilibria in this game, given the response function F (·) satisfy
F ((1− s)b−
s(1− γ)
r
= γ (3.15)
b = E(γ) (3.16)
The specialty of this model is that there might be several equilibria. For
instance, if (1 − s)E(1) > c, then the value γ = 1 (everybody is corrupt) is
in the equilibrium set. If (1− s)E(0) < sw
r
+ c, then there is no corruption at
all. In that case, the expected value of the equilibrium bribe when all others
are honest is not high enough to cover the expected loss of future salaries
and the costs of the most corrupt prone official.
The distribution of ci could be bell-shaped. Then there would be for
instance two stable and one unstable equilibrium levels of γ on the supply
side for a given value of b. They are given by the intersections between the
γ-curve and the F-curve.
[Andvig and Moene, 1990] present the various possible equilibria for dif-
ferent variants of distribution of c. They also present an extension in which
the the moral costs for each agent on both the demand and the supply side can
be endogenized and subsequently depend on the behavior of others. Then, if
the incidence of corruption is high, the moral costs of being corrupt too will
be lower. Also, the probability of detection could depend negatively on the
level of corruption or the probability of a regime shift could increase with
the level of corruption. In all of these cases, the view presented in the model
that corruption increases with its incidence is strengthened.
An important “message” from this model is that the stable supply side
equilibria can be improved by a salary increase and that “in cases with multi-
ple quilibria the permanent wage increase necessary to fulfill a certain (low)
target level of honest bureaucrats is independent of whether one starts out
in a high corruption equilibrium or in one with low corruption. The only
difference is that from the high equilibrium level it may be necessary to offer
a higher wage for a while to induce the equilibrium supply to converge to the
’low level’ supply curve. After this transition the trade-offs between salary
and corruption are of course the same in the two cases” (ibid, 76). A cut in
public spending might thus lead to higher incidence of corruption, yet, the
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contrary effect might occur in countries with much political (as opposed to
bureaucratic) corruption.
Chapter 4
Hypotheses
Deducing from the literature and the theoretical models used, we can now
formulate a number of hypotheses to be tested empirically:
Hypothesis 1 Governments advocating a large size of government (“leftist”)
tend to be more corrupt than free-market oriented governments.
Pro: Governments might have high spendings because politicians were
bribed in order to e.g. buy new military equipment. More government spend-
ings also provide for more opportunities to channel government funds into
corrupt politicians’ or officials’ pockets.
Against: [Kaufmann, 1998] shows that there is no correlation between a
government’s ideology and the country’s CPI. But, ideology need not neces-
sarily correlate with the size of government - democratic “leftist” governments
can be small, whereas authoritarian “rightist” governments might be large.
Hypothesis 2 Corruption is related to density and population size, with
higher populated countries being more corrupt.
Hypothesis 3 Corruption is determined by the quality of democracy in a
country. Especially, fiscal decentralization (that is, the assignment of ex-
penditure functions and revenue sources to lower levels of government) is
associated with lower levels of corruption [De Mello, 2004].
Hypothesis 4 Corruption can be self-reinforcing and there can be multiple
equilibria “whereby organizations or societies with the same institutional char-
acteristics can experience very different corruption levels.” [Aidt, 2003, 647]
Therefore, history plays a prominent role as a determinant of corruption.
Hypothesis 5 Corruption is related to a high degree of regulation and gen-
erally low incentives for firms to operate in the formal economy.
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Hypothesis 6 The incidence of corruption can be explained by the variation
in policies/regulations across industries [Svensson, 2003].
Hypothesis 7 Firms’ “ability to pay” and firms’ “refusal power” can explain
a large part of the variation in bribes across graft-reporting firms [Svensson, 2003].
Hypothesis 8 The level of corruption for specific public services depends
on whether those services are complements or substitutes (Grabbing Hand
Theory).
Hypothesis 9 While there might be a short-run interaction between corrup-
tion and GDP, in the long-run causality is entirely from income to corrup-
tion. Thus, as [Gundlach and Paldam, 2000] shows, as a country gets richer,
it becomes less corrupt.
Pro: An Instrumental Variable Analysis in [Gundlach and Paldam, 2000]
provides some evidence in favor of the hypothesis.
Against: There is only short-run data available on corruption, which
makes proving the counter-claim impossible. Furthermore, measuring the
evolution of corruption is difficult for lack of coherent data.
Hypothesis 10 Russia’s and other high corruption countries’ pattern of
corruption corresponds to the independent monopolists pattern of the toll-
booth theory, leading foreign investors to invest in another country instead.
Other possible hypotheses (which will not be tested in chapter 6) could
be:
Hypothesis 11 Apart from the formal regulatory environment, the actual
application of those rules (which is dependent on government officials’ level
of discretion in interpretation and implementation of regulation) is an im-
portant determinant of corruption.
This hypothesis can be tested by looking at three elements:
• The share of the informal sector in the GDP should be higher when
there is more regulation and more discretion for public officials.
• This share should be larger when there is a bigger tax burden on firms
operating in the formal economy.
• The larger the informal sector, the worse the quality of public services
should be.
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Tests of this hypothesis in the late 1990s have shown to provide significant
results [Johnson et al., 1998].
Hypothesis 12 Corruption can be explained by the degree of political con-
nectedness of firms [Faccio, 2004].
Hypothesis 13 Hierarchical structures of government favor corruption, as
argued by [Hillman and Katz, 1987].
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Chapter 5
Methodology and Data
If you torture the data long enough, it will confess.
- Ronald Coase
[Svensson, 2005, 22] distinguishes three different types of measures on
corruption:
• Indicators of corruption assembled by private risk-assessment firms such
as the International Country Risk Guide, produced by Political Risk
Services, capturing the “likelihood that high government officials will
demand special payments and the extent to which illegal payments are
expected throughout government tiers. The obvious disadvantage of
such data, apart from the fact that it does not measure corruption but
rather the political risk involved in corruption, is that it is priced at
US$ 4,7251, though older versions of the data are available on the web.
• The second group of widely used datasets are perceptions-based sources,
such as Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index2 or
the World Bank’s Control of Corruption3, which is part of the Bank’s
broader set of worldwide governance indicators. Both indexes are com-
posites of third-party data and correlate highly.
• The third group provides not ordinal indexes as the two others, but car-
dinal measures. Main proponents of this group are the joint European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and World Bank
Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS)
1http://www.prsgroup.com
2http://www.transparency.org
3http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp
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and the UNODC’s International Crime Victim Surveys (ICVS), which
focus more on individuals than on firms.
5.1 Methodology
5.1.1 Panel data
While doing econometric analysis on cross-sectional data is relatively
straight-forward using Ordinary Least Squares estimators, we might also
want to look at development over time and thus perform some panel data
analysis. In our case, two main problems arise:
1. The cross-sectional sample is relatively small with a maximum of
28 countries. Since data are not always available for every year and
every country and since not all countries were actually existing since
the beginning of transition (the Soviet Union was dissolved in 1991,
when transition was already well under way in the CEE countries; Yu-
goslavia’s split-up was a gradual process with declarations of indepen-
dence between 1991 and 20084), the actual number of countries used
for estimations varies and sometimes becomes quite low.
2. Transition (more or less) started in 1989. This gives a maximal time
dimension of the panel (T) of 20. Since e.g. the CPI is available only
since 1995, T can be even smaller. Since the Least Squares Dummy
Variable (LSDV) model with a lagged dependent variable produces bi-
ased estimates when the panel’s T is small, this bias cannot be com-
pletely dismissed [Judson and Owen, 1999]. [Judson and Owen, 1999]
recommend using a one-step GMM estimator for Ts smaller than 10,
the same or the Anderson-Hsiao estimator for T = 20 and LSDV for
T = 30 for unbalanced panels and Kiviet’s corrected LSDV estimator,
LSDVC, for balanced panels.
5.1.2 Extreme Bounds Analysis
Two papers applied the Extreme Bounds Analysis of [Sala-i-Martin, 1997]
to find determinants of corruption: [Seldayo and de Haan, 2005] and [Serra, 2004].
The latter finds five variables that are robustly related to corruption: GDP,
democratic institutions, share of Protestants, political instability, and the
4Among the sample used, Montenegro was the last republic to declare its independence
(2006). Kosovo was left out for reasons already explained in the introduction.
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country’s colonial heritage. [Seldayo and de Haan, 2005] use 40 variables, of
which 20 pass the test.
A similar approach can be used for our sample of transition economies.
The data used in the two papers cited above are by now already ten years
old and could thus be revisited.
Following [Seldayo and de Haan, 2005], the methodology of the Extreme
Bounds Analysis (EBA) is specified as follows:
Y = αM + βF + γZ + u (5.1)
with Y being the dependent variable (that is, a corruption measure), M a
vector of “standard” explanatory variables (but left to zero since there is no
theoretical guidance and a wide variety of results reported in previous stud-
ies), F the variable of interest, Z a vector of up to three possible additional
explanatory variables; and u the error term. The variable F is not robustly
related to Y if the lower extreme bound for βˆ (the lowest value for βˆ minus
two standard deviations) is negative, while the upper extreme bound for βˆ
(the highest value for βˆ plus two standard deviations) is positive. Another
possibility is to look at the distribution of the coefficient estimates. Because
parameters of interest can have some positive as well as negative support,
[Sala-i-Martin, 1997] suggests classifying the corresponding regressor as a ro-
bust determinant if the average 90% confidence interval does not include zero.
Looking at the distribution of the coefficient estimates thus produces a much
larger set of robust variables. In line with [Seldayo and de Haan, 2005], a
more stringent 95% criterion is used.
5.2 The Corruption Perceptions Index
The Corruption Perceptions Index is a perception-based index published
every year since 1995 by Berlin-based NGO Transparency International. By
attributing a sample of countries a number on a scale of 0 to 10 (0 being
most corrupt, 10 being least corrupt), it establishes a world-wide ranking of
countries.
5.2.1 Method
The CPI is a composite index “drawing on corruption-related data from
expert and business surveys carried out by a variety of independent and rep-
utable institutions.” It “reflects views from around the world. including those
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of experts who are living in the countries evaluated.”5 It includes surveys
of business people and country analysts (non-resident and resident experts,
though, according to TI, viewpoints of both groups of experts correlate well).
The 2007 and 2008 CPIs ranked 180 countries, the criterion for inclusion be-
ing the availability of at least three reliable sources of corruption-related data
for a country or territory and is thus independent of the existence of corrup-
tion (meaning that if a country is not included, this does not mean that there
is no corruption). Even though the index is freely available, “some sources
do not allow disclosure of the data that they contribute.”
Data for our sample is completely available for 2008, but during the 90s,
only a few transition economies were included in the CPI. The first year with a
relatively usable amount of data is 1999, where 24 out of 27 (Montenegro not
yet being separated from Serbia) countries are available. In comparison: 1998
features twelve countries, 1996 four (Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic,
and Russia) and 1995 only Hungary.
5.2.2 Caveat
An important thing to note is that a higher CPI means a lower level of
corruption. Some papers (like [Gundlach and Paldam, 2000]) invert the CPI
so that a higher score signifies more corruption. But since the CPI is a fairly
widely-known index and inverting it might lead to some more confusion, this
thesis uses it in its original form.
5.2.3 Discussion
The CPI is basically a ranking of countries. Thus, the actual informa-
tional value provided by the index is relatively small. Especially, it gives no
hint at how corruption is actually shaped, that is, whether a country shows
rather grand corruption or rather petty corruption. Furthermore, it proba-
bly has a bias towards non-corrupt countries: the number of surveys used
to compose the index varies among countries and years and correlates with
the level of corruption, thus somewhat confirming an observation often made
in economics, namely that “the winners write history” (e.g. [Easterly, 2002,
64]).
This variance of the number of surveys used also means that the possibil-
ity to compare CPIs across years is somewhat limited. Not only that scores
are not comparable over time, also the place of a country in the ranking
5Source for all quotes in this paragraph: FAQ on Transparency International’s web-
site, http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2008/
faq#general1
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avg CPI avg SU
avg CPI 1.0000
avg SU 0.5713 1.0000
Table 5.1: Correlation matrix for average CPI and average number of surveys
used (1995-2008)
cannot be compared as other countries enter or leave the ranking between
years. A country’s rank can thus worsen just because additional countries,
for which enough surveys are now available, entered the ranking.
An improvement of the CPI would have to include the abandonment of
the current policy of eclectically mixing survey results. By establishing the
possibility to compare CPIs year-to-year, it would also be possible to measure
the effect of new policies. Some economists use the CPI as a measure of
corruption in time series nevertheless. For example, a theory from Evgeny
Gavrilenkov, chief economist at Troika Dialog in Moscow, is paraphrased in
a news article on Bloomberg:
“The [’Chart of the Day’] shows corruption rises and falls with
the price of oil. Russia had its best-ever score on Transparency
International’s corruption perceptions index in 2004 when the
price of Urals crude, Russia’s chief export blend, averaged $34.18
a barrel. The country received its worst score last year since
2001 when Urals surged to a record $142.94 a barrel and averaged
$95.10.”6
From there he concludes that “[i]f money is cheap and easily available,
as it is when oil revenues are flowing in, people don’t mind paying bribes.”
This, as a blog of Global Integrity argues, is a wrong usage of the CPI in a
time series analysis7.
Yet, Transparency International themselves state that “[y]ear-to-year changes
in a country’s score can either result from a changed perception of a coun-
try’s performance or from a change in the CPI’s sample and methodology”
and that “[t]he only reliable way to compare a country’s score over time is to
6Source: Bloomberg article “Russian Corruption May Fall With Slump in Oil: Chart of
the Day” from January 26, 2009; last accessed March 15, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.
com/apps/news?pid=20601109&sid=azKnwOVcasBw&refer=home
7Source: Global Integrity Commons blog, post from February 4, 2009;
last accessed March 15, 2009, http://commons.globalintegrity.org/2009/02/
hey-experts-stop-abusing-corruption.html
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go back to individual survey sources, each of which can reflect a change in
assessment.”8
In fact, the number of surveys used to calculate Russia’s CPI in 2004 was
15, but in 2008 only eight surveys were used - the change in CPI from 2.8 to
2.1 can therefore only be hardly significant. Notwithstanding the problem of
its empirical implementation, it should nevertheless be added that the theory
behind that argument makes sense: In a times of a high oil price, competition
for oil rents will be large, but small if the oil price is low.
An OECD study critical of governance indicators notes that “the fact
that users [of perception-based indexes] tend to rely on the same indica-
tors which they see their peers using has led to a veritable bubble effect”
and thus that “perceptions-based governance indicators can be subject to
herd behavior by the ’experts’ on whose assessments they tend to rely.”
[Arndt and Oman, 2006, 90]
Transparency International counters this claim by stating that “this hy-
pothesis was tested in 2006 using a survey question posed to business leaders
around the world. Based on more than 9000 responses, knowledge of the
CPI does not induce business experts to ’go with the herd’. Knowledge of
the CPI may motivate respondents to determine their own views. This is a
strong indication that there is no circularity in the present approach.”9 The
OECD study also underlines that such an index reflects primarily business-
oriented perceptions, which can be of considerable value of its own right, but
leaves out the perspective of non-business interests (ibid). Indeed, household
surveys on corruption are never conducted. A critique from an epistological
standpoint is that results from perception-based indicators are only hardly
replicable (ibid).
5.3 TI Global Corruption Barometer
Transparency International also conducts an annual household survey
which collects their experience with petty corruption and their perceptions of
overall incidence of corruption. It specifically tests the frequency of corrup-
tion in (i) political parties, (ii) parliament/legislature, (iii) media, (iv) the
military, (v) the education system, (v) the legal system/judiciary, (vi) medi-
cal services, (vii) the police, (viii) registry and permit services, (viii) utilities
8Source: FAQ section on Transparency International’s website, http:
//www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2008/faq#
interpreting4, as of March 15, 2009
9Source: FAQ on Transparency International’s website, http://www.transparency.
org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2008/faq#general1
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Figure 5.1: CPI by country between 1995 and 2008
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(telephone, electricity, water, etc.), (ix) tax revenue, and (x) customs.
5.4 The Global Integrity Index
The index by Global Integrity is published yearly and “assesses the exis-
tence, effectiveness, and citizen access to key national-level anti-corruption
mechanisms across a diverse range of countries.” It thus differs from the
CPI in that it does not measure corruption, but rather the “’medicine’ be-
ing used against it - in the form of government accountability, transparency,
and citizen oversight.” The index aggregates over 300 integrity indicators
systematically gathered for each country covered. For the 2008 index, “those
indicators comprised more than 15,000 peer-reviewed questions and answers
scored by [GI’s] in-country experts. Several rounds of review are conducted
at the international level to ensure that cross-country comparisons are valid.
In addition, all assessments are reviewed by a country-specific, double-blind
peer review panel comprising additional local and international subject mat-
ter experts.”10
5.5 CPI - GII
Obviously, where anti-corruption measures are high, corruption should
be low. CPI and GII should therefore be positively correlated. As figure 5.2
shows, this is in fact the case.
CPI2008 GII2008
CPI2008 1.0000
GII2008 0.4466 1.0000
Table 5.2: Correlation matrix for CPI and GII
5.6 Global Competitiveness Report 08
The Global Competitiveness Report prepared by the World Economic
Forum (WEF) conducted a survey in 138 countries and asked the following
questions in its section on the quality of institutions11:
10Source for all quotes in this paragraph: Global Integrity website, http://report.
globalintegrity.org/globalIndex.cfm, accessed March 15, 2009
11Source: www.weforum.org
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Figure 5.2: CPI and GII: There seems to be a clear positive relation between
the two.
1. Property rights in your country, including over financial assets, are (1
= poorly defined and not protected by law, 7 = clearly defined and
well protected by law)
2. Intellectual property protection and anti-counterfeiting measures in
your country are (1 = weak and not enforced, 7 = strong and enforced)
3. In your country, diversion of public funds to companies, individuals, or
groups due to corruption (1 = is common, 7 = never occurs)
4. Public trust in the financial honesty of politicians in your country is (1
= very low, 7 = very high)
5. Is the judiciary in your country independent from political influences of
members of government, citizens, or firms? (1 = no - heavily influenced,
7 = yes-entirely independent)
6. When deciding upon policies and contracts, government officials in your
country (1 = usually favor well-connected firms and individuals, 7 =
are neutral)
7. The composition of public spending in your country (1 = is wasteful,
7 = efficiently provides necessary goods and services not provided by
the market)
60 CHAPTER 5. METHODOLOGY AND DATA
8. Complying with administrative requirements (permits, regulations, re-
porting) issued by the government in your country is (1 = burdensome,
7 = not burdensome)
9. The legal framework in your country for private businesses to settle
disputes and challenge the legality of government actions and/or reg-
ulations is (1 = inefficient and subject to manipulation, 7 = efficient
and follows a clear, neutral process)
10. Are firms in your country usually informed clearly by the government
of changes in policies and regulations affecting your industry? (1 =
never informed; 7 = always informed)
11. The threat of terrorism in your country (1 = imposes significant costs
on businesses, 7 = does not impose significant costs on businesses)
12. The incidence of common crime and violence in your country (1 =
imposes significant costs on businesses, 7 = does not impose significant
costs on businesses)
13. Organized crime (mafia-oriented racketeering, extortion) in your coun-
try (1 = imposes significant costs on businesses, 7 = does not impose
significant costs on businesses)
14. Police services in your country (1 = cannot be relied upon to enforce
law and order, 7 = can be relied upon to enforce law and order)
15. The corporate ethics (ethical behavior in interactions with public offi-
cials, politicians, and other enterprises) of firms in your country are (1
= among the worst in the world, 7 = among the best in the world)
16. Financial auditing and reporting standards regarding company finan-
cial performance in your country are (1 = extremely weak, 7 = ex-
tremely strong, the best in the world)
17. Corporate governance by investors and boards of directors in your coun-
try is characterized by (1 = management has little accountability, 7 =
investors and boards exert strong supervision of management decisions)
18. Interests of minority shareholders in your country are (1 = not pro-
tected by law, 7 = protected by law and actively enforced)
The data from the GCR with its relatively wide set of indicators covers
up to seven years (2001-2007).
5.7. BEEPS QUESTIONNAIRE 61
Using these questions, the World Bank constructs six variables: Voice
and Accountability; Political Stability and Absence of Violence; Government
Effectiveness; Regulatory Quality; Rule of Law; Control of Corruption. For
pragmatic reasons, these variables will be used in the regressions instead of
the answers to all 18 questions.
5.7 BEEPS questionnaire
The World Bank and the Office of the Chief Economist at the EBRD
developed the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey
(BEEPS) for 26 transition economies and Turkey12 in 1999 and 200013.
The questionnaire can broadly be separated into two parts: one dealing
with institutions and policies, that is, the macro-dimensions, and one dealing
with bureaucracy, state intervention and corruption, which represent the
micro-dimensions. A representative sample of about 3,000 firms is taken. By
including questions on the perception of problems that are also externally
measurable, the bias in in perception can be estimated (e.g. by asking about
infrastructure capacity and comparing the answers with hard data such as
the number of telephone lines per capita or by doing the similar procedure
with exchange rate variability). [Hellman et al., 2000b] find that the data do
not suffer significantly from country perception bias, with the exception of
Armenia which apparently tends to be overly pessimistic.
Questions at the micro-level on corruption include questions on the fre-
quency of bribery (How often would you say the following statement is true?
“It is common for firms in my line of business to have to pay some irregular
’additional payments’ to get things done.”), the proportion of firms admit-
ting to paying bribes, the percent of revenue typically paid per year in unof-
ficial payments to public officials, the uncertainties associated with bribery
(“Firms in my line of business usually know in advance about how much this
’additional payment’ is.”; “If a firm pays the required ’additional payments’
the service is usually also delivered as agreed.”; “If a firm pays the required
additional payment to a particular government official, another government
official will subsequently require an additional payment for the same ser-
12Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia (presumably the Federation of Bosnia
and Herzegovina), Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kaza-
khstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Republica Srpska
(part of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but not of the Federation), Romania, Russia, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Turkey, Ukraine, Uzbekistan. It does not include: Montenegro (not yet indepen-
dent at the time)
13The full data and questionnaire are available online at
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/beeps/ (as of March 15, 2009)
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vice.”), the recipient of bribes (that is, the price of the various “services” that
bribes are paid for), the connectedness of bribery with public procurement,
bureaucratic accountability, lobbying, the degree of influence over the state,
tax arrears and subsidies.
At the macro-level, questions ask about the quality of public institutions,
institutional obstacles to business, grand corruption (i.e. stemming from
parliamentary votes, presidential decrees, central bank, criminal court de-
cisions, arbitration court decisions, political contributions, patronage, taxes
and regulations), taxes and corruption (“Would you pay additional taxes to
eliminate corruption, crime and excessive regulation?”), perceptions of the
legal system, property rights, predictability (“How predictable are changes
in the government’s economic and financial policies which materially affect
your business?”), predictability over time, attitudes of the government to-
wards business and on overall perceptions of government services.
5.7.1 Discussion
The dataset provides data with a great level of detail. Unlike the CPI,
which produces only a mere ranking of countries and is not consequent in
its use of data sources, the BEEPS (a) is not biased towards non-corrupt
countries, (b) not only gives an idea of the general level of corruption, but
also distinguishes between petty and grand corruption and allows for deduc-
tions on the shape of corruption in each individual country, (c) uses a large
enough sample for statistically relevant results, and (d) asks firm executives
in the transition economies and not Western “experts”. As conducting such
a survey requires an enormous effort, it was only conducted once. Therefore,
we unfortunately do not have any information on the development over time.
5.8 Indicators for democracy, freedom, and progress
towards market economy
• RSF: Reporters sans frontières produce an annual worldwide Press
Freedom Index since 2002 and is available at www.rsf.org. It is based
on expert assessment on a scale of 0 to 114 (the higher, the worse).
• EBRD: The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development pro-
duces several indicators measuring progress towards market economy
status. On a scale of 1 to “4+” (1 representing little or no change
from a rigid centrally planned economy, they (staff and consultants)
assess progress in the areas (i) large scale privatization, (ii) small scale
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privatization, (iii) enterprise restructuring, (iv) price liberalization, (v)
trade and foreign-exchange system, (vi) competition policy, (vii) bank-
ing reform and interest rate liberalization, (viii) securities markets and
non-bank financial institutions, (ix) overall infrastructure reform, (x)
telecommunications, (xi) railways, (xii) electric power, (xiii) roads, and
(xiv) water and waste water.14
5.9 Budget data and economic indicators
• Government balance: Government balance in percent of GDP were
taken from the EBRD (see link above).
• FDI: Foreign direct investment inflow in percent of GDP for the years
2006 and 2007 were also provided by the EBRD.
• Government expenditure on education: Measured in percent of
GDP. The data are not available for all years for all countries and are
usually from the years 2005, 2006, or 2007. Source: EBRD.
• Household expenditure on power and water: Measured in per-
cent. Source: EBRD.
5.10 Other
Apart from the above-mentioned indicators, there is a variety of other
indexes, though probably less prominent, especially due to their limitedness
in scope. For instance, in 1994, [Neumann, 1994] produced what was later
to be called the German corruption index [Faccio, 2004]. It is based on
interviews with German exporters and asked them about the proportion of
the transactions involving bribes. This index is insofar of historical value
as it was produced relatively early (1994, one year before the first CPI was
published, which, at the time, also featured only a very small sample) and
because, when the survey was conducted, bribing foreign government officials
was not a crime in Germany, which somewhat improves its objectiveness.
5.11 Data not used
Some papers use the number of convictions on bribe charges as an indi-
cator of corruption. For example, [Leeson and Sobel, 2008] investigates the
14http://www.ebrd.com/country/sector/econo/stats/index.htm
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effect of bad weather, that is, natural disasters and the subsequent availabil-
ity of FEMA funds, on political corruption at the state level in the United
States. This approach makes sense in a setting were the judiciary can be
considered honest. Yet, in transition economies, corruption is more often
than not also part of the judiciary. Additionally, especially in authoritarian
countries like some in the CIS, the regime might use corruption charges to
silence opposition.
Chapter 6
Evidence
6.1 Descriptive Statistics
Sub-sample Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Former Yugoslav Republics
(incl. Slovenia1)
6 4.117 1.333292 3.2 6.7
Former Yugoslav Republics
(excl. Slovenia)
5 3.6 .4690416 3.2 4.4
CIS countries 12 2.317 .6365152 1.8 3.9
New EU Member States 10 5.02 1.011929 3.6 6.7
Albania 1 3.4 . 3.4 3.4
Total sample 28 3.55 1.420094 1.8 6.7
Table 6.1: Descriptive statistics for the CPI 2008 in the four sub-samples
CPIs for the year 2008 in our sample vary between 1.8 and 6.7, meaning
that the spread of about 5 is equivalent to roughly half the scale. The
former Soviet Union countries regularly score lowest. The former Yugoslav
republics score much better on average (their average CPI being about 78%
higher than the CIS country’s). The new EU Member States perform best,
with an average CPI about 116% higher than the CIS’s average and 22%
above the ex-Yugoslav average (note though that Slovenia is counted into
the averages of new EU Member States as well as of the former Yugoslav
countries; Table 6.1 also includes an average excluding it from the latter
group). Albania belongs to none of these groups and has a CPI of 3.4, which
happens to be within one standard deviation of both ex-Yugoslav averages.
This is insofar interesting as Albania’s regime between 1944 and 1992 (when
the first president who was not from the Party of Labour of Albania was
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elected) was more oriented towards first the Soviet Union and later China
than towards Yugoslavia.
6.2 Indicators
6.2.1 International Treaties
International treaties, for instance within the framework of the United
Nations’ Office on Drugs and Crime endeavors, might have been an indicator
for a country’s government’s political will to fight corruption. Yet, the United
Nations Convention on Corruption has 140 signatories, of which 131 are
parties to the convention. In particular, all countries (with the sole exception
of Estonia) from the sample signed it2. This means that, at least publicly,
governments try to signal their opposition to corruption - which yet again
shows how unrelated to their implementation UN conventions are.
6.2.2 Law and practice
The Global Integrity Index distinguishes between anti-corruption mea-
sures in law and anti-corruption measures in practice (see figure 6.2.2). The
difference between those two is called the “implementation gap.”3 Using this
implementation gap, we can establish a relation to the CPI. The result, as
shown in figure 6.2.2, is not very surprising: the larger the implementation
gap, the worse the CPI score.
6.3 Results from the BEEPS survey
The main results from the BEEPS survey are presented mainly descrip-
tively in [Hellman et al., 2000b] and more analytically in [Hellman et al., 2000a].
Interesting in the former is their test for possible perception biases. By com-
paring perceptions from the survey (e.g. perceptions on the quality of infras-
tructure) with actual data (e.g. data on infrastructure), they find that there
is no systematical over- or underestimating of the extent of problems within
the interviewee’s countries.
2UNODC website, as of March 3, 2009
3The data used in the calculations here were rounded to integers on a 0-100 scale. The
original dataset from Global Integrity provides data with 13 digits after the comma, which
does not seem to be an appropriate level of precision for a perception-based index. Results
may thus differ from any provided by Global Integrity.
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Figure 6.1: Anti-corruption measures in law and in practice as scored by the
Global Integrity Index 2008
68 CHAPTER 6. EVIDENCE
AZEBEL
BOS
BUL
GEO
HUN
KAZ
KYR
LIT
MAC
MOL
MON
POL
ROM
RUS
SER
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
cp
i2
00
8
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
GII2008_IG
Figure 6.2: CPI and Global Integrity Index “implementation gap”
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6.3.1 Constructing Indicators
Similarly to [Treisman, 2003], we can take the up to 71 questions asked
and group them in categories. Treisman generates three variables: “frequency
of state capture”, “bribe burden”, and “corruption obstacles” (ibid, 7).
“Frequency of state capture” can be derived from answers given to the
question “How often do firms like yours nowadays need to make extra, unof-
ficial payments to public officials for any of the following: to get connected
to public services, to get licenses and permits, to deal with taxes and tax
collection, when dealing with customs / imports, when dealing with courts,
to influence the content of new laws, decrees, or regulations, other?” (1 =
Always, 6 = Never). Since the averages of all sub-questions are very similar
within each country, not much information is lost by using the average of the
eight answers4.
To test the monopoly power of public officials, we can use answers to
question Q31: “How often is the following statement true: ’If a government
agent acts against the rules I can usually go to another official or to his supe-
rior and get the correct treatment without recourse to unofficial payments.” ’
(1 = Always, 6 = Never). By taking the means for each country, we can
construct an index (called POmonopoly) to be included in the regressions5.
6.4 CPI and Global Competitiveness Report
The regression in table 6.2 tries to relate the six variables from the WEF
survey to the CPI. Including all six leaves two of them being statistically
insignificant, even though they are significant in other regressions. Note the
R square of 97.7%.
6.5 CPI and other measures of corruption
The correlation between the CPI and other measures of corruption is
relatively high (the correlation between the CPI and the World Bank’s cor-
ruption measure is 0.7063 for our sample). For this reason, only the CPI
is used as a measure of corruption in the regressions (with the exception of
those regressions that include data from the BEEPS survey, which provides
its own measure).
4The averages exclude the possible answer “Don’t know/no answer”.
5For Bosnia, an average of Bosnia and Republica Srpska was used.)
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Table 6.2: CPI and WEF indicators
Variable Coefficient
(Std. Err.)
Voice and Accountability -12.272∗∗
(3.404)
Political Stability and Absence of Violence 0.304
(1.365)
Government Effectiveness 5.148∗
(1.819)
Regulatory Quality 5.771†
(2.914)
Rule of Law 1.617
(4.011)
Control of Corruption 6.583∗
(2.752)
N 25
R2 0.977
F (6,19) 136.088
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
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6.6 Extreme Bounds Analysis
As a first example of an extreme bounds analysis, we can try to relate the
BEEPS “frequency of state capture” variable to the CPI. A problem in this
regression is that data from different years are used. But since the change of
CPI is relatively small even over a ten year period, this is not a serious issue
(the correlation between CPI1999 and CPI2007 is 0.8897).
EBA 1 Tests the effect of the “frequency of state capture” variable on the
CPI, with government expenditure on education, household expenditure on
power and water, Control of Corruption and FDI inflow.
• Dependent variable: CPI2007
• Variable of interest: frequencystatecapture
• Explanatory variables: expedu exppowerwater GCB07CC FDIin-
flow2007
• Result: See table 6.3.
This result is consistent: the coefficient for frequencystatecapture is pos-
itive (remember that higher is better), meaning that the frequency of state
capture in the BEEPS survey translates consistently into a corresponding
CPI.
Table 6.3: EBA with CPI 2007, frequency of state capture, and Z(nx4) vector
Dvar = cpi2007
F = frequencystatecapture
Z = expedu exppowerwater GCB07CC FDIinflow2007
beta t p-val .95 C.I. VIF Zs
Min 1.6114 2.1029 0.0471 0.0222 3.2005 1.05 [z2]
Max 1.8489 2.3318 0.0293 0.2045 3.4934 1.06 [z4]
A total of 4 combinations of 1 regressor from the Z(nx4) vector were used.
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6.7 Test of the hypotheses
6.7.1 Hypothesis 1
EBA 2 Tests the effect of government expenditure and EBRD transition
indicators on the CPI.
• Dependent variable: CPI2007
• Variable of interest: govexp2007
• Explanatory variables: lprivatization sprivatization entrestruct pricelib
• Result: See table 6.4.
Table 6.4: EBA with CPI 2007, government expenditure, and Z(nx5) vector
Dvar = cpi2007
F = govexp2007
Z = lprivatization sprivatization entrestruct pricelib loggdppc2008
beta t p-val .95 C.I. VIF Zs
Min 0.0515 2.1555 0.0409 0.0023 0.1006 1.01 [z4]
Max 0.0523 2.1637 0.0402 0.0025 0.1021 1.01 [z2]
A total of 5 combinations of 1 regressor from the Z(nx5) vector were used.
Thus, the amount of government expenditure in percent of GDP con-
sistently has a positive effect on the CPI, which disagrees with hypothesis
1. Also the regression . regress cpi2007 govexp_2007 loggdppc2008
yields positive coefficients for both variables. This is probably due to the
fact that richer countries also spend more in relative terms. If we now com-
pare countries with similar GDP (e.g. the group of New Member States) and
do the same regression again, that is,
regress cpi2007 govexp_2007 loggdppc2008 if EU == 1,
then government expenditure has a negative coefficient, though statisti-
cally not significant. Especially, the coefficient is positive for both the group
of former Yugoslav republics and the group of former Soviet republics.
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6.7.2 Hypothesis 2
It is suggested by [Kaufmann, 1998, 138] that highly populated coun-
tries, ceteris paribus, appear to be more likely to be corrupt. This puzzling
result is contradicted by even more puzzling data on transition economies:
high population density is linked with a high CPI (though only at the 90%
significance level), that is, with lower corruption, even when controlling for
GDP per capita (which is unrelated to density in the sample). Yet, Central
European countries seem to be more densely populated than former Soviet
Union countries. We therefore control for the groups EU, EXYU and CIS.
By including those dummies, the coefficient for density becomes insignificant,
while the dummies EU and EXYU are significant at the 1 percent level.
Table 6.5: CPI2008 and density
Variable Coefficient
(Std. Err.)
density 0.014†
(0.007)
Intercept 2.533∗∗
(0.564)
N 28
R2 0.136
F (1,26) 4.079
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
6.7.3 Hypothesis 3
EBA 3 As an indicator for the quality of democracy, we use the “Voice and
Accountability” variable (GCS08VA) and perform an EBA explaining the CPI
for 2008.
• Dependent variable: CPI2008
• Variable of interest: GCS08VA
• Explanatory variables: loggdppc2008 EXYU CIS EU
• Result: See table 6.9. Quality of democracy is related to a better CPI
score, with the coefficient being lowest for the EXYU-subsample and
highest for countries in the EU-subsample.
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Table 6.6: CPI2008, density, and GDP
Variable Coefficient
(Std. Err.)
GDP2008TSD 0.169∗∗
(0.021)
density 0.010∗
(0.004)
Intercept 1.323∗∗
(0.333)
N 28
R2 0.767
F (2,25) 41.097
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
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Figure 6.3: CPI 2008 and density. A weak, but positive relation, significant
at the 90% level only.
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Figure 6.4: GDP per capita in 2008 (in thousand USD) and density. Regres-
sions show no significant relation.
Table 6.7: GDP and density
Variable Coefficient
(Std. Err.)
density 24.505
(35.551)
Intercept 7158.228∗
(2851.909)
N 28
R2 0.018
F (1,26) .475
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
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Table 6.8: CPI, density, and dummies
Variable Coefficient
(Std. Err.)
density 0.003
(0.004)
EXYU 1.093†
(0.557)
CIS -0.254
(0.607)
EU 2.245∗∗
(0.556)
Intercept 2.394∗∗
(0.664)
N 28
R2 0.774
F (4,23) 19.696
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
Table 6.9: EBA with CPI 2008, voice and accountability, and Z(nx4) vector
Dvar = cpi2008
F = GCS08VA
Z = loggdppc2008 EXYU CIS EU
beta t p-val .95 C.I. VIF Zs
min 7.1503 2.6248 0.0151 1.5151 12.7855 1.09 [z4]
Max 11.2084 2.7907 0.0104 2.8999 19.5168 1.00 [z2]
A total of 4 combinations of 1 regressor from the Z(nx4) vector were used.
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A similar result is achieved with RSF2007 as indicator for quality of
democracy. The coefficients for RSF2007 are significant and negative (a
higher RSF score means less freedom of the press).
6.7.4 Hypothesis 4
To check whether societies with the same institutional characteristics ex-
perience very different corruption levels, we can use the dummy variables
EXYU, EU, and CIS as proxies for institutional arrangements. Table 6.1
gives the average CPI for each subsample with the standard deviation and
minimum and maximum values. All groups show a certain spread: the former
Yugoslav republics’ is the largest, with the maximum value being more than
the double of the minimum. The same is the case with the CIS subsample
and it is almost the case for the new EU Member States.
As mentioned above, the measurement over time is difficult to perform,
given that the methodology is not consistent and that mostly short-term
data is available. A Fixed Effects Model estimation produces the result in
table 6.10. An Arellano-Bond linear dynamic panel-data estimation produces
the result in table 6.11. The result remains approximately the same if the
variable SU (number of surveys used) is included (see table 6.12).
Table 6.10: Fixed Effects Model
Variable Coefficient
(Std. Err.)
year 0.034∗∗
(0.009)
Intercept -63.995∗∗
(18.093)
N 266
R2 0.055
F (28,237) 13.892
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
6.7.5 Hypothesis 5
EBA 4 As an indicator for the quality of regulation, we use the “Quality of
Regulation” variable (GCS08RQ) and perform an EBA explaining the CPI
for 2008.
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Table 6.11: Arellano-Bond linear dynamic panel-data estimation (lag = 1)
Variable Coefficient
(Std. Err.)
L.cpi 0.675∗∗
(0.051)
year 0.026∗∗
(0.006)
Intercept -51.074∗∗
(12.437)
N 200
χ2(2) 218.317
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
Table 6.12: Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimation including number
of surveys used (lag = 1)
Variable Coefficient
(Std. Err.)
L.cpi 0.655∗∗
(0.051)
year 0.032∗∗
(0.007)
su -0.026∗∗
(0.010)
Intercept -62.423∗∗
(13.080)
N 200
χ2(3) 227.241
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
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• Dependent variable: CPI2008
• Variable of interest: GCS08RQ
• Explanatory variables: loggdppc2008 CC07registry comppolicy gov-
exp2007
• Result: See table 6.13. Quality of regulation is related to a better CPI
score.
Table 6.13: EBA with CPI 2008, quality of regulation, and Z(nx4) vector
Dvar = cpi2008
F = GCS08RQ
Z = loggdppc2008 CC07registry comppolicy govexp2007
beta t p-val .95 C.I. VIF Zs
min 7.2444 2.8076 0.0158 1.6225 12.8662 1.12 [z4]
Max 10.4097 7.0508 0.0000 7.3555 13.4638 1.01 [z2]
A total of 4 combinations of 1 regressor from the Z(nx4) vector were used.
6.7.6 Hypothesis 6
“Frequency of state capture” varies only slightly (between 4.9 and 5.5)
across service industries as well as between manufacturing industries (be-
tween 5.2 and 5.7).
Surprisingly, also the variation between countries is very low. The average
answer (over all observation, not by countries) is 5.150345 with a standard
error of .0170929. The mean of the country means is 5.152801 with a standard
deviation of .0676753.
6.7.7 Hypothesis 7
For this hypothesis, we use the BEEPS dataset again as it provides firm-
level data. For the explained variable (variation in bribes), we can use Q30
“When firms in your industry do business with the government, how much
of the contract value would they typically offer in additional or unofficial
payments to secure the contract?” or Q27 “On average, what percent of
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Figure 6.5: Frequency of state capture by sector
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revenues do firms like yours typically pay per annum in unofficial payments
to public officials?”. For the explaining variables, we can use Q24 “What
percentage of senior management’s time per year is spent in dealing with
government officials about the application and interpretation of laws and
regulations?” and Q31 (see above).
All coefficients are highly significant: Bribes are higher the more time is
or has to be spent with public officials and the better the officials’ negotiating
position is (due to his or her monopoly power). The R squared is very low,
though.
Table 6.14: BEEPS: Bribe incidence (Q27) and public officials’ control rights
Variable Coefficient
(Std. Err.)
q31 0.182∗∗
(0.021)
q24 0.218∗∗
(0.021)
Intercept 3.276∗∗
(0.149)
N 1719
R2 0.099
F (2,2489) 94.027
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
6.7.8 Hypothesis 8
Relevant for the Grabbing Hand Theory is question 26b: “If a firm pays
the required additional payment to a particular government official, another
government official will subsequently require an additional payment for the
same service.” The coefficient is statistically significantly linked to higher
bribe payments, with a very small R squared (about 12%).
6.7.9 Hypothesis 9
As shown in the introduction, GDP and CPI are highly correlated. A
tempting thing to do would be to test how the CPI developed with GDP
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Table 6.15: BEEPS: Bribe incidence (Q27) and public officials’ control rights
(ordered logit)
Variable Coefficient
(Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : q27
q31 0.294∗∗
(0.032)
q24 0.313∗∗
(0.033)
Equation 2 : cut1
Intercept -2.359∗∗
(0.252)
Equation 3 : cut2
Intercept 1.553∗∗
(0.169)
Equation 4 : cut3
Intercept 2.535∗∗
(0.176)
Equation 5 : cut4
Intercept 3.808∗∗
(0.189)
Equation 6 : cut5
Intercept 5.008∗∗
(0.210)
Equation 7 : cut6
Intercept 6.283∗∗
(0.262)
N 1719
Log-likelihood -2554.322
χ2(2) 173.608
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Table 6.16: BEEPS: Bribe incidence (Q30) and public officials’ control rights
Variable Coefficient
(Std. Err.)
q31 0.089∗∗
(0.025)
q24 0.120∗∗
(0.025)
Intercept 1.724∗∗
(0.128)
N 1152
R2 0.03
F (2,1149) 17.93
over time. Since poor countries are more corrupt than rich ones, and since
transition economies grew strongly in the last 20 years, it could be expected
that the CPI increased in the same time. Yet, here comes in the problem
mentioned in Section 5.2.3, namely that the CPI is not easily comparable
between years. This problem can be reduced a little bit by aggregating.
The situation almost ten years before the 2008 CPI, in 1999, was as
summarized in table 6.18.
Again, comparing CPIs over time is problematic. Since we are com-
paring aggregate CPIs, we could assume that measurement errors cancel
out on average. It can then be seen that corruption scores did not change
much over time. This is quite a discrepancy with the hypothesis that cor-
ruption disappears when countries get richer. As a matter of fact, transi-
tion economies grew enormously between 1999 and 2008, as summarized in
table 6.19. If we apply the results from the regression presented in table
6.20 to the GDP growth rates, then the CPI would had had to increase
by values similar to those presented in column 3 in table 6.19, that is,
log(growthrate) ∗ βloggdppc2008.
EBA 5
• Dependent variable: CPI2008
• Variable of interest: log of GDP per capita 2008
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Table 6.17: BEEPS: Bribe incidence (Q30) and public officials’ control rights
(ordered logit)
Variable Coefficient
(Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : q30
q31 0.146∗∗
(0.038)
q24 0.171∗∗
(0.040)
Equation 2 : cut1
Intercept -0.222
(0.199)
Equation 3 : cut2
Intercept 1.485∗∗
(0.203)
Equation 4 : cut3
Intercept 2.844∗∗
(0.217)
Equation 5 : cut4
Intercept 3.714∗∗
(0.233)
Equation 6 : cut5
Intercept 4.635∗∗
(0.269)
N 1152
Log-likelihood -1688.395
χ2(2) 32.901
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Sub-sample Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Former Yugoslav Republics
(incl. Slovenia)
4 3.5 1.749286 2 6
Former Yugoslav Republics
(excl. Slovenia)
3 2.67 .6506407 2 3.3
CIS countries 10 2.38 .4709329 1.7 3.4
New EU Member States 10 4.32 1.00973 3.3 6
Albania 1 2.2 . 2.3 2.3
Total sample 24 3.22 1.196727 1.7 6
Table 6.18: Descriptive statistics for the CPI 1999 in the four sub-samples
Group Combined GDP Estimated increase
growth in CPI
Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, 76.66% 0.06
and Macedonia
New EU Member States 101.78% 0.07
CIS 167.18% 0.108
Table 6.19: GDP growth between 1999 and 2008
• Explanatory variables: government account 2007, government ex-
penditure 2007, RSF 2007
• Result: log GDP per capita has a positive effect on the CPI. See table
6.21.
From these regressions we can conclude that high growth rates are only
linked to a very small change in perceived corruption, probably an effect
much smaller than the errors of measurement. Corruption levels are less
explained by a flow variable like GDP, but rather by the dummies related to
the institutional setting and historical background, that is, whether a country
is a former Soviet republic, a Central and Eastern European country, or a
former Yugoslav republic. For some reasons, ex-Yugoslavia and the new EU
Member States were able to strongly improve their score despite lower growth
rates than the CIS countries, which even though becoming relatively richer
than the others, even saw a slight (though statistically probably insignificant)
drop in the corruption score.
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Table 6.20: CPI 2008, log GDP per capita, and dummies
Variable Coefficient
(Std. Err.)
loggdppc2008 0.253
(0.206)
EXYU 0.900
(0.561)
CIS -0.308
(0.580)
EU 1.906∗∗
(0.607)
Intercept 0.598
(1.778)
N 28
R2 0.783
F (4,23) 20.689
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
Table 6.21: EBA with CPI 2008, log GDP per capita, and Z(nx3) vector
Dvar = cpi2008
F = loggdppc2008
Z = rsf2007 govexp2007 GA2007
beta t p-val .95 C.I. VIF Zs
min 0.6819 4.5842 0.0001 0.3761 0.9876 1.24 [z1]
max 1.1024 6.3150 0.0000 0.7436 1.4612 1.02 [z3]
A total of 3 combinations of 1 regressor from the Z(nx3) vector were used.
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6.7.10 Hypothesis 10
The regression . reg fdiinflow2007 cpi2007 and related EBAs (with
CPI as well as with TI’s Global Corruption Barometer index) produce no sta-
tistically significant coefficient. The hypothesis can thus not be supported.
Yet there is literature finding significant results using a worldwide sample
(e.g. [Teksöz, 2005]). [Javorcik and Wei, 2009] find that corruption not only
lowers inward FDI but also shifts the ownership structure towards joint ven-
tures (though they use data from 1995). This supports the argument that
corruption increases “the value of using a local partner to cut through the
bureaucratic maze” (ibid).
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Chapter 7
Conclusions
7.1 Data
Criticism of perceptions indexes in general, and the Corruption Percep-
tions Index in special has been presented. A recurring issue is the lack of
“hard data” (as the WEF puts it) immanent to the topic; since data used
by economists is mostly provided by state authorities (as the etymology of
statistics suggests), this problem can hardly be solved, especially given that
collecting data can be very expensive. The impossibility of intertemporal
comparisons of some indexes is a big obstacle and can easily lead to wrong
conclusions when nevertheless done (see for instance Gavrilenkov’s theory
on the link between corruption and the oil price). Maybe it would suffice
to conduct extensive surveys only every couple of years, as corruption (an
institutional problem) is unlikely to change significantly within a year. A
bi- or tri-annual index that produces a wide sample and is comparable over
time might give us more information than the yearly Corruption Perceptions
Index with its high variance in the number of surveys used.
Nevertheless there are smart ways to find at least indicators for corruption
taking place, be it only by looking at traffic violations in New York City.
All in all, it was possible to draw conclusions from the existing data,
despite all shortcomings. Though some inconsistencies with the theory re-
mained, much of it was nevertheless confirmed.
7.2 Causality
Causality is a “dangerous” word in the context of econometrics. Too
easily, correlation is confused with causality. This thesis has presented sev-
eral correlations, but has to remain somewhat vague or ambiguous about
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causalities. One key to understanding causality is the time horizon. There
is some reproducible, probably even undisputed, evidence that in the short
run, corruption has detrimental effects on growth; at the same time, there
is literature showing that the long-run causality is just the opposite. We
should nevertheless always keep in mind that econometrics is maybe not the
adequate tool to come to definite conclusion on this issue.
7.2.1 Elements specific to transition economies
Economic development is a tremendous factor in explaining corruption.
Yet, there is not much literature on why exactly low economic development,
as measured by GDP, is linked to corruption. It has furthermore been shown
that there are specific transition-related elements and indicators explaining
the incidence of corruption in former Socialist countries.
All in all, the statement in [Berglof and Bolton, 2001] that “ [a] grow-
ing and deepening divide has opened up between transition countries where
economic development has taken off and those caught in a vicious cycle of
institutional backwardness and macroeconomic instability” can only be con-
firmed.
7.3 Further research
Every country has its own idiosyncrasies and reasons for bad or good
development; it would thus be necessary to do elaborate case-studies on each
country, optimally combining economic, political scientist, sociological and
other analyses. At the same time, there are patterns across countries, that
should and could be explained further by theoretical frameworks.
A major factor that was left out in this thesis is corruption within compa-
nies and non-governmental organizations. This kind of corruption is almost
unexplored and virtually uncontrolled [Levin and Satarov, 1999, 115]. Since
transition is characterized by privatizations, it is reasonable to guess that pat-
terns of corruption at state-owned firm level were transferred into the private
sector, while it could also be argued that those privatizations were more often
than not acts of corruption by themselves. Maybe research on how credits
were obtained from commercial banks in exchange for bribes can contribute
to explain parts of the current credit crunch in transition economies.
At the same time, we should also keep in mind some skepticism of anti-
corruption rhetoric. [Levin and Satarov, 1999, 121] noted that compromising
materials and accusations of corruption were used during the phase of pri-
vatization in Russia as powerful weapons against adversaries. Allegations
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of corruption can easily be constructed in authoritarian countries, a promi-
nent example being the case of former Malaysian deputy prime minister and
now opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim, who was put in prison for a couple of
years on very controversial and criticized1 convictions of corruption and even
“sodomy.” Levin, too, warns that high perceived levels of corruption might
lead to an uprise of totalitarian movements that promise to fight corruption,
but reminds us also of the fact that exactly such totalitarian regimes are in
fact the most corrupt.
1see for instance http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/ASA28/015/2003
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Appendix A
Appendix: Stata code
Unless specified otherwise, all regressions in this paper use Stata’s reg
command with dependent and independent variables as indicated in the re-
spective table. Note that “>” in the beginning of a line indicates a line break
and is not part of the code. All of the code was written for version 10.
A.1 Introduction
Table 1.1: For this table, the package grand2 provided by StataCorp.
was used to calculate an estimate of the grand mean and the differences
therefrom.
. fit cpi2008 EXYU EU CIS other, hascons
. grand2 EXYU EU CIS other
. outtex, detail level below title(CPI2008: Estimates
> as grand mean/intercept and marginal impacts)
A.2 Evidence
The Extreme Bounds Analysis was performed using the eba package writ-
ten by Gregorio Impavido of the World Bank. Its syntax is
. eba var1 var2 varlist [if exp] [in range], [x(varlist)
> type(#) level(#) vif(#) ci(#) details]
var1 is the dependent variable (called Y in the specification in section
5.1.2), var2 corresponds to the F variable (the variable of interest), and
varlist is the list of variables forming the Z vector (the additional ex-
planatory variables). The results given by the command are the respective
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minimum and maximum bounds values for β, t-statistic, p-value, a 95% con-
fidence interval, variance inflation factor (VIF), and Z variables used. The
maximum VIF is set to 10,000 by default.
For the panel data analysis, the following code was used:
reshape long cpi su GA govexp_, i(index) j(year)
tsset index year
xtreg cpi year, fe
xtabond cpi year su
and the results were reported again with the outtex command.
Appendix B
Summary in German / Deutsche
Zusammenfassung
Die Diplomarbeit gibt anfangs einen Überblick über die bestehende Liter-
atur zur ökonomischen Analyse von Korruption und den Transitionsprozessen
in Zentral- und Osteuropa (inklusive Albanien und den ehemaligen jugoslaw-
ischen Republiken) sowie den ehemaligen Sowjetrepubliken. Drei formale
Modelle werden vorgestellt. Das erste folgt jenemModell, das von [Aidt, 2003]
beschrieben wird, und geht von der Annahme einer wohlmeinenden Regierung
aus. Das zweite ist das Grabbing-Hand-Modell von [Shleifer and Vishny, 1993].
Das dritte betrachtet [Andvig and Moene, 1990] folgend eine Situation der
sich selbst verstärkenden Korruption. Aus dem Literaturüberblick und den
formalen Modellen werden mehrere Hypothesen abgeleitet. Zehn von diesen
Hypothesen werden dann anhand eines Samples bestehend aus 28 Tran-
sitionsökonomien überprüft. Um die Auswirkung des Hinzunehmens von
zusätzlichen Variablen auf den erklärenden Effekt einer bestimmten Vari-
able (z.B. eines Korruptionsmaßes) zu testen, werden sogenannte Extreme-
Bounds-Analysen durchgeführt. Die verwendeten Daten stammen u.a. von
der NGO Transparency International und der Weltbank (insbesondere aus
dem BEEPS-Datensatz).
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graduation: Spring 2009)
• Mag. phil., Political Science at the University of Vienna (expected
graduation: Summer 2009)
• Exchange semester at the Universidade Nova de Lisboa (2006/2007,
through the ERASMUS program)
• Exchange semester at the University of Western Australia (2007, through
the universities’ joint study program)
• Lycée Français de Vienne, specialization on sciences (1989-2001)
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Fields of interest and specialization
• Industrial Organization, Transition Economics, Development Economics,
Macroeconomics, Law-and-Economics
• International Relations, Central and Eastern Europe, Political Theory
Professional experience (selection)
• Currently freelancer at the Austrian Institute of Economic Research
(WIFO)
• Freelancer at eclareon GmbH (2008)
• Internship with the United States Mission to International Organiza-
tions in Vienna, Austria (2007/2008)
• Alternative civilian service at the German Resistance Memorial (2004/2005)
Spoken languages
English, French, German, Italian, basic Spanish and Portuguese
Other activities
• Participation in the Banking Summer College organized by the Man-
agement Academy at the Vienna University of Economics and Business
Administration (Summer 2008)
• Participation in the Altenmarkt Seminar in American Studies on invi-
tation by the Fulbright Commission (Spring 2006)
• Study trip to Bosnia-Herzegovina (Spring 2006)
• Study trip to the UN Headquarters in New York, to the International
Monetary Fund and to the World Bank in Washington, DC (Spring
2004)
• Study trip to the European Parliament in Brussels, to UNESCO in
Paris and to the International Court of Justice in The Hague (Fall
2003)
